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Introduction ge´ne´rale et Re´sume´
de the`se
L
e but de cette the`se est d’apporter un regard nouveau et critique sur le chan-
gement syste´mique dans les pays de l’ancien bloc sovie´tique. Si les re´formes
e´conomiques ne´cessaires au passage de la planification centrale a` l’e´conomie de
marche´ ont fait objet de nombreuses e´tudes, la transformation du roˆle de l’Etat
a rec¸u moins d’attention. La de´re´glementation des prix, la stabilisation macroe´-
conomique et la privatisation devaient constituer les principaux ingre´dients du
succe`s de la ”the´rapie de choc” pre´conise´e par certains e´conomistes a` l’aube de la
transition. Cependant, il n’a gue`re e´te´ question du roˆle de l’Etat dans ce nouvel
environnement qu’est l’e´conomie de marche´.
En abordant la transition, les pays de l’Est semblaient s’orienter vers le libe´ra-
lisme. Les observateurs occidentaux craignaient alors qu’apre`s avoir tant accepte´
d’un E´tat omnipre´sent, ces pays soient de´sormais tente´s par un refus non moins
dangereux de tout interventionnisme. Aujourd’hui pourtant, la re´alite´ du post-
socialisme nous de´montre que la transition signifie syste´matiquement un repli de
l’action publique. L’Etat demeure de moins en moins pre´sent a` l’Est et c’est le
poids de cette pre´sence que nous voulons ici aborder.
1
Il ne s’agit pas pour autant d’appliquer une vieille me´thode d’analyse des de´-
penses publiques pour saisir le nouveau roˆle de l’Etat. Nous en de´crirons seulement
le mouvement, la structure et les e´ventuelles contraintes. Ensuite, nous tenterons
de nous rapprocher de vrais ” de´fis ” pour l’Etat, Etat qui se voit de´sormais confier
le roˆle de gardien des marche´s et d’acteur principal dans la marche vers une e´cono-
mie de bien-eˆtre. En retenant l’exemple polonais pour appre´cier concre`tement ce
que l’on peut de´ja` pressentir comme des nouvelles responsabilite´s de l’Etat, nous
avons choisi d’analyser les trois roˆles de l’Etat suivants :
- L’Etat - re´gulateur ;
- L’Etat - fournisseur des biens publics ;
- et L’Etat - garant du bien-eˆtre collectif.
L’essentiel de notre the`se est construit autour de ces trois ” de´fis ” pour l’Etat
dans les pays en transition. Les trois chapitres consacre´s a` chacun de ces trois
de´fis sont pre´ce´de´s par un chapitre pre´liminaire, dans lequel nous nous inte´ressons
aux motifs de l’intervention publique. Nous y menons une enqueˆte unique dans
son genre, enqueˆte dont le but est de confronter les de´faillances de marche´ aux
de´faillances de l’action publique.
Quels sont les motifs de l’intervention publique ? Fondamentalement, qu’est-ce
qui ame`ne l’Etat a` intervenir dans le jeu du marche´ ? Dans ce chapitre pre´li-
minaire, nous tentons d’apporter, d’un point de vue the´orique, une synthe`se des
de´bats sur ces questions incontournables pour la science e´conomique.
De nos jours, rares sont ceux qui nient la ne´cessite´ d’une intervention publique
dans l’e´conomie. Aussi peu nombreux sont ceux qui contestent l’inte´reˆt du recours
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aux me´canismes de marche´. Un consensus semble ainsi avoir e´merge´ autour d’une
troisie`me voie, entre le ”tout-Etat ”et le ”tout-marche´ ”, entre le dirigisme e´tatique
radical et le ” laissez-faire ” absolu. Cette troisie`me voie re´sulte tant de de´saccords
sur la nature et l’ampleur des imperfections de chaque mode de re´gulation, que
d’appre´ciations diffe´rentes sur l’aisance avec laquelle ces imperfections peuvent eˆtre
corrige´es. Toujours est-il que le roˆle e´conomique de l’Etat se conc¸oit difficilement en
dehors de sa relation au marche´. En particulier, si l’on se place dans une e´conomie
de marche´, une condition ne´cessaire de la le´gitimite´ de l’intervention publique est
que l’Etat est susceptible de ” faire mieux ” que le marche´.
”Faire mieux”, mais selon quel crite`re ? L’une des re´ponses possibles ame`ne
l’Etat a` intervenir pour des raisons d’efficacite´. Nous proposons une revue de cette
litte´rature dans la premie`re partie du chapitre. Trois motifs base´s sur l’e´conomie du
bien-eˆtre sont traditionnellement e´voque´s pour justifier l’intervention publique : la
stabilisation e´conomique, l’allocation optimale des ressources et la redistribution.
Les moyens de´ploye´s par l’Etat afin d’atteindre ses objectifs incluent (i) la re´gle-
mentation face aux de´faillances du marche´ (le monopole naturel, par exemple), (ii)
l’internalisation des externalite´s (lorsque l’action de consommation ou de produc-
tion d’un agent a des conse´quences sur le bien-eˆtre d’au moins un autre agent sans
que cette interde´pendance soit reconnue par le syste`me de prix) et (iii) la ” four-
niture ” de biens publics. Ce dernier moyen s’est re´ve´le´ eˆtre fe´cond puisque, graˆce
a` son caracte`re “non-rival” et “non-exclusif”, le bien public contribue a` augmenter
le bien-eˆtre collectif.
Une autre raison e´voque´e pour l’intervention de l’Etat dans les jeux de marche´
s’explique par la longue tradition de l’Etat gardien des “services d’inte´reˆt ge´ne´ral”.
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Ce roˆle de l’Etat prend tout son sens surtout en Europe, ou` les services publics, tels
qu’ils existent aujourd’hui, ont puise´ dans l’he´ritage conceptuel du XIXe`me sie`cle.
C’est pourquoi l’Europe pre´sente une grande diversite´ de traditions en matie`re de
service public. Les mode`les allemand, britannique et nordique se distinguent no-
tamment du mode`le des services publics ”`a la franc¸aise”. Cette diversite´ est l’une
des raisons pour lesquelles l’Union europe´enne utilise le terme de ”service d’inte´reˆt
ge´ne´ral” (SIG) dans le but, non pas de fusionner les diffe´rentes approches natio-
nales existantes, mais plutoˆt de ” de´gager ” le ”fond europe´en commun” derrie`re les
notions de service public et universel. Nous nous concentrons justement sur l’Eu-
rope. Nous trac¸ons les grandes lignes des lois relatives, lois qui se sont construites
de manie`re jurisprudentielle au gre´ des arreˆts de la Cour de Justice des Commu-
naute´s Europe´ennes. Nous pre´sentons ensuite les secteurs soumis a` des obligations
de SIG. Enfin, nous re´sumons le de´bat actuel autour des me´thodes de financement
de ces services.
Si dans certains cas elle s’ave`re eˆtre justifie´e pour corriger les de´faillances de
marche´, l’intervention de l’Etat ne peut qu’avoir des conse´quences aggravantes sur
le niveau de bien-eˆtre ge´ne´ral. Nous e´tudions ce proble`me en analysant les argu-
ments de l’Ecole du choix public. Cette litte´rature est marque´e par une vision
de ” l’Etat-re´gulateur ”, ou` des offreurs (les de´cideurs politiques et les fonction-
naires) et des demandeurs (les entreprises jouissant d’une situation de monopole)
de la re´glementation sont guide´s par leurs propres inte´reˆts. Les mandataires des
fonctionnaires (les partis politiques) cherchent uniquement a` obtenir le plus grand
nombre de voix dans les e´lections. Les dirigeants des partis n’ont pour but que
de retirer le maximum d’avantages personnels de l’exercice du pouvoir. La moti-
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vation le plus souvent preˆte´e aux fonctionnaires est leur passage dans l’industrie
re´glemente´e. Tout comme les bureaucrates qui maximisent la production de leurs
services administratifs, ils peuvent aussi multiplier le nombre de re´glementations
afin que leurs directions prennent de l’importance. Du coˆte´ des demandeurs de re´-
glementation, ce sont les entreprises qui veulent eˆtre prote´ge´es de la concurrence.
En contrepartie des re´glementations qu’elles obtiennent, les entreprises contribuent
aux financements des campagnes e´lectorales, apportent des voix en engageant leur
notorie´te´ et offrent des carrie`res dans le secteur prive´. Ces me´canismes nuisibles
sont re´unis sous le terme de “the´orie de la capture de la re´glementation”. Les the´o-
riciens correspondants (Posner et Peltzman, entre autres) proposent une solution
radicale pour limiter l’action des groupes de pression : retirer a` l’Etat le droit de
re´glementer.
Dans ce chapitre pre´liminaire, nous e´nonc¸ons des arguments qui, du point
de vue d’efficience e´conomique, justifient l’intervention publique. Nous pre´sentons
aussi des contre-arguments qui, quant a` eux, proˆnent l’absence de toute implication
de l’Etat dans le jeu du marche´. Une remarque finale s’impose : le marche´ et l’Etat
constituent tous les deux d’imparfaits organes de re´gulation e´conomique. Cette
remarque est cruciale du point de vue de la politique e´conomique. Ne´anmoins, il
est important de faire la distinction entre les buts de la politique e´conomique et
les moyens d’y parvenir. Les objectifs englobent l’efficacite´ e´conomique (au sens
large du terme), ainsi que la justice sociale (bien que la signification de ce terme
varie en fonction de la the´orie sociale applique´e). De leur coˆte´, les me´thodes in-
cluent la redistribution et l’intervention directe sur le marche´ sous la forme d’une
re´glementation, d’un financement public ou` bien de la provision en biens publics.
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Finalement, toute organisation d’activite´ sociale et e´conomique puise dans ce me´-
lange des marche´s prive´s et de la production publique. Cette conclusion nous ame`ne
directement a` nous inte´resser a` deux courants de la pense´e e´conomique qui - au
lieu de classer les activite´s e´conomiques par rapport a` l’appartenance au marche´ ou
a` l’Etat - s’interrogent sur le choix de la meilleure structure de gouvernance pour
chacune des transactions conside´re´es. Par conse´quent, nous trac¸ons les grandes
lignes de La Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle, ainsi que du mouvement de la
Nouvelle Gestion des Affaires Publiques.
Puisque notre proble´matique ge´ne´rale nous place dans le contexte de la transi-
tion syste´mique, nous consacrons la deuxie`me partie de ce chapitre pre´liminaire au
de´bat sur le roˆle approprie´ que l’Etat devrait jouer dans ce nouvel environnement.
Nous rappelons d’abord, la ne´cessite´ de la structure institutionnelle claire, com-
pre´hensible et re´active a` tous les agents e´conomiques, pour que les transactions
volontaires ne se fassent pas “dans le vide”. Pour s’acquitter de ces taˆches, l’Etat
a donc besoin de certaines institutions bien conc¸ues, dirige´es par des personnes
compe´tentes et guide´es par des incitations approprie´es. Il est cependant clair que
de telles institutions n’apparaissent pas graˆce a` un ” simple ” coup de baguette
magique. En particulier, il faut se souvenir du fait que les pays avec une longue
tradition de l’e´conomie de marche´ ont mis des de´cennies a` perfectionner leurs ins-
titutions, et qu’ils ont eux aussi fre´quemment duˆ mettre en œuvre de nombreuses
ame´liorations. Par la suite, nous soulignons aussi le temps ne´cessaire a` la popula-
tion pour que celle-ci s’adapte a` des nouvelles re`gles du jeu. Nous nous penchons
aussi sur le roˆle catalyseur de l’Etat, Etat qui doit veiller a` ce que les effets pervers
de la transition e´conomique ne se re´percutent pas sur l’e´quilibre du bien-eˆtre de
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l’ensemble de ses citoyens, cre´ant ainsi des graves conflits sociaux et ” de´te´riorant
” par la meˆme occasion la justice sociale. Par conse´quent, nous traitons le sujet
des privatisations, privatisations qui - au lieu de contribuer a` une augmentation
ge´ne´rale du bien eˆtre collectif - cre´e`rent souvent, par des me´thodes inadapte´es, ou
bien des ope´rations malmene´es, des ine´galite´s flagrantes.
Nous cloˆturons ce chapitre par quelques re´flexions sur l’e´tat ge´ne´ral de la tran-
sition, encore appele´ ” post-transition ”. Nous faisons le constat que, de`s lors qu’un
pays a fait la transition a` l’e´conomie de marche´, le roˆle de l’Etat devient foncie`re-
ment diffe´rent. Au lieu d’intervenir directement dans l’activite´, il agit surtout par
l’interme´diaire du syste`me fiscal, du budget, de la redistribution et de quelques
re´glementations essentielles. Puisque le stade de re´formes dites “re´actives” est de´-
sormais franchi, il conviendrait de poursuivre - ou dans certains cas d’entamer -
des re´formes sociales. Les gouvernements des pays en transition ne devraient pas
tarder a` mettre en œuvre de telles re´formes. Le marche´ du travail, les retraites et
la sante´ : voici quelques exemples figurant sur la liste des chantiers a` entreprendre
dans les anne´es a` venir. Enfin, nous clamons qu’il est impossible et malavise´ de se
de´barrasser de tout l’he´ritage de l’ancien syste`me et ce, surtout dans le domaine
social. Des nouvelles solutions doivent eˆtre envisage´es pour que les agents e´cono-
miques se retrouvent a` nouveau dans la situation d’une se´curite´ sociale, qui reste
encore l’une des valeurs les plus regrette´es du socialisme, comme le dernier chapitre
de notre the`se peut en te´moigner.
Dans la suite de la the`se, nous pre´sentons trois e´tudes empiriques qui ana-
lysent les roˆles de l’Etat pre´ce´demment e´nonce´s. Nous nous inte´ressons a` un pays
particulier, la Pologne. Ce choix se justifie par plusieurs raisons. Tout d’abord, la
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Pologne est plutoˆt conside´re´e comme un pays qui a bien re´ussi sa premie`re e´tape
de la transition. Toutefois, il n’en va pas de meˆme pour les re´formes sociales, ou
celles engage´es dans le cadre de l’ame´nagement du territoire. Donnons-en quelques
exemples. Premie`rement, on avait re´forme´ le syste`me des pensions et des retraites
en Pologne, tout en laissant de coˆte´ le secteur de la sante´. Deuxie`mement, les
privatisations mene´es dans le secteur e´nerge´tique, certes fort re´ussies, avaient par-
tiellement e´vince´ la question de l’e´quite´ dans le cas de la tarification. Enfin, troisie`-
mement, confronte´s a` des ressources budge´taires limite´es qu’ils pouvaient consacrer
a` la construction des infrastructures, les gouvernements successifs s’e´taient tour-
ne´s vers les investisseurs prive´s, en se souciant peu des me´thodes employe´es et des
re´sultats obtenus.
Dans le chapitre 2, en analysant le secteur de la distribution de l’e´lectricite´
en Pologne, nous mettons en e´vidence le dysfonctionnement des autorite´s de re´-
gulation ainsi que les facteurs qui en sont la cause. Nous commenc¸ons avec une
bre`ve description du secteur e´nerge´tique en Pologne : la re´forme du sous-secteur de
l’e´lectricite´ constituait l’un des plus grands de´fis pour l’Etat polonais a` l’aube de
la transition. Le passage vers les prix d’e´lectricite´ qui couvriraient les couˆts de la
production et d’acheminement, le de´mentalement des monopoles, et la cre´ation des
organes de re´glementation. Voici la` quelques taˆches auxquelles les gouvernements
polonais transitoires devaient faire face pendant la premie`re de´cennie de re´formes,
alors que les voisins de l’Ouest de la Pologne avaient mis pre`s d’un demi sie`cle a`
les mettre en œuvre. Apre`s avoir de´crit cet environnement complexe, nous pro-
ce´dons a` un test empirique du fonctionnement du processus re´glementaire. Notre
objectif est double. D’une part, comme la re`glementation polonaise d’e´lectricite´ est
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fonde´e sur des simples mode`les du type“price-cap”, nous souhaitons savoir si les ta-
rifs re´glemente´s refle`tent des ve´ritables couˆts et de´penses des firmes distributrices.
D’autre part, nous contribuons a` la discussion tre`s fre´quente dans la litte´rature,
qui s’interroge sur le lien entre les performances et la productivite´ des entreprises
dans les pays en transition.
La me´thodologie de la frontie`re de production stochastique et le mode`le DEA
(Data Envelopment Analysis) permettent de mesurer le niveau de l’efficience tech-
nique de quelques 31 firmes - distributrices de l’e´lectricite´ en Pologne pour la per-
iode 2001-2003. Ces deux me´thodes pre´sentent des inte´reˆts majeurs pour analyser
l’efficience technique. Elles permettent en effet d’estimer l’e´cart entre l’activite´
productive observe´e et l’activite´ the´orique optimale. La distinction entre les deux
me´thodes concerne la forme de la frontie`re. En fait, si l’on estime qu’elle peut
eˆtre repre´sente´e de manie`re valide par une fonction comportant des parame`tres
explicites - comme la forme de la fonction de production -, l’approche adopte´e est
qualifie´e de parame´trique. Si par contre on conside`re que le processus de produc-
tion n’est pas de nature a` se laisser apprivoiser par le carcan d’une telle fonction
ou n’a pas a` priori une forme fonctionnelle bien de´termine´e, l’approche adopte´e est
qualifie´e de non parame´trique. Notre mode`le simple de la frontie`re stochastique
est base´ sur les travaux de Battese et Coelli [1995] et l’e´quation de´rive´e prend la
forme d’une fonction Cobb-Douglas. Le mode`le DEA, quant a` lui, s’inspire des
travaux de Charnes et al. [1978]. La base de donne´es utilise´e est unique et a e´te´
construite a` partir des informations provenant du Bureau Van Dijk (“Amadeus”)
et de l’Association polonaise de la distribution et de la transmission des e´nergies.
Nous pre´sentons alors les estimations des parame`tres de la fonction de production :
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tous les parame`tres sont significatifs au seuil de 5%, ce qui traduit un potentiel
explicatif e´leve´ du mode`le. Par la suite, nous calculons des notes d’efficience tech-
nique pour chacune des firmes distributrices ; l’intervalle de ces scores est compris
entre 32 et 99 % du niveau optimal. Nous attribuons aussi des notes d’efficience
a` partir des estimations non parame´triques (DEA). Cette fois-ci, l’intervalle est
compris entre 32% et 100% (100% e´tant le niveau d’efficience de la meilleure en-
treprise). Il est important de noter que le fait qu’une firme ait le score de 0,65
(ce qui est la moyenne de notre e´chantillon) signifie qu’elle pouvait atteindre son
niveau actuel de la production en utilisant 65 % de ses inputs. En terme de re´gle-
mentation, cela signifie que le ” price-cap ” pour cette firme devrait eˆtre base´ sur
le 65% de ses de´penses et couˆts.
Afin de rendre cette e´tude plus pertinente, nous unifions les re´sultats obtenus
par ces deux me´thodes : en y appliquant les conditions de consistance de Bauer
[1998] nous arrivons a` e´tablir le classement des meilleurs et des mauvaises entre-
prises.
Le message principal de ce chapitre est le suivant : les me´thodes de ”benchmarking
” peuvent eˆtre applique´es a` des fins re´glementaires. Toutefois, au regard des effets
d’efficience technique assez me´diocres pour les distributeurs polonais, ces me´thodes
doivent eˆtre utilise´es avec pre´caution et eˆtre conside´re´es par l’Etat comme des si-
gnales plutoˆt que comme des indicateurs de´finitifs des performances. Finalement,
on peut voir dans ce genre d’e´tudes un moyen pour combler le de´ficit informa-
tionnel de l’Etat : le de´cideur public n’est plus dans l’obligation de s’en remettre
a` l’information qui lui est transmise par les entreprises, naturellement tente´es de
de´former cette dernie`re a` leur profit. L’action publique n’encourt plus le risque
d’eˆtre victime d’un opportunisme pre´-intervention. Dote´ d’un me´canisme re´ve´la-
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teur, ” l’Etat - re´gulateur ” a beaucoup plus de chances de bien parame´trer ses
interventions.
Ce chapitre contient aussi une section comple´mentaire, ou` nous esquissons la
situation actuelle du service public de l’e´lectricite´. Nous de´battons de l’avenir du
secteur, ainsi que des menaces qui pe`sent sur les usagers dans une situation de
libe´ralisation imminente du secteur.
La deuxie`me e´tude de cette the`se est consacre´e a` l’Etat - fournisseur des biens
publics. De par leur nature, les biens publics sont finance´s et produits par le secteur
public. Ne´anmoins, l’intervention des entreprises prive´es dans l’approvisionnement
en ces biens, ainsi que dans la gestion des services publics devient une re´alite´
quotidienne. Ceci est vrai non seulement dans le cas des services municipaux (ap-
provisionnement en eau potable, assainissement, gestion des de´chets, transport
urbain), mais aussi dans le cas des grands projets d’infrastructure (routes, ponts,
rails..). L’Etat fait appel aux entreprises prive´es via des contrats de concession.
Cette dernie`re pratique est amene´e a` se de´velopper avec la libe´ralisation des in-
dustries de services publics et la recherche de nouveaux modes de gestion de ces
activite´s, avec notamment des partenariats public-prive´ (PPP). Ces pratiques, tre`s
re´pandues dans les pays de´veloppe´s, connaissent depuis le de´but des anne´es 80 un
succe`s spectaculaire dans les pays en voie de de´veloppement, et les pays d’Ame´-
rique Latine en particulier. Par conse´quent, les PPP ont vite retrouve´ une place
importante dans la pratique de l’approvisionnement des biens publics dans les pays
en transition, ou` les gouvernements n’ont pas pu mener des grands travaux a` cause
de ressources budge´taires tre`s limite´es.
Dans le chapitre 3, l’efficacite´ du roˆle de l’Etat dans la fourniture des biens
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publics - et implicitement son impact sur la croissance e´conomique - est analyse´e
a` partir du me´canisme d’attribution par appel d’offre de concessions autoroutie`res
en Pologne. Nous prenons l’exemple d’une concession pour l’autoroute A2, qui
devrait un jour relier Varsovie a` Berlin. Pour mieux comprendre la situation ac-
tuelle des infrastructures en Pologne, nous pre´sentons la gene`se du programme
des grands travaux. Nous y de´crivons des plans ambitieux de constructions des
autoroutes qui datent des anne´es 1930 et qui, malheureusement, ont e´te´ ane´antis
a` cause de la guerre, d’abord, et de l’e´poque communiste apre`s. En provoquant
une forte augmentation des e´changes, la dynamique de la transition a re´veille´ la
conscience des gouvernements successifs en forc¸ant ces derniers a` re´fle´chir sur les
modes de financement des infrastructures, de´sormais indissociables des re´formes
structurelles.
Comme nous l’avons de´ja` mentionne´, l’e´tat du budget national a fait basculer
le gouvernement sur la voie du partenariat public-prive´. Malgre´ le succe`s de la pre-
mie`re mise aux enche`res en 1997, les travaux de construction n’ont gue`re avance´.
En analysant le processus d’appel d’offre, d’adjudication de la concession et de sa
mise en œuvre, nous trouvons, comme pre´vu, que la fourniture des infrastructures
se heurte en effet a` un certain nombre d’obstacles qui ame`nent a` s’interroger sur
les conditions de son efficacite´. Plus pre´cise´ment, nous montrons qu’il y avait un
certain nombre d’erreurs, tant de la part de l’Etat (dans la coordination des or-
ganes de tutelle ou la gestion de´le´gue´e), que de la part des partenaires prive´s (cf.
la faiblesse des fonds, ou la non-exe´cution des contrats). Dans ce chapitre, nous
recourons a` la the´orie des couˆts de transaction, des contrats incomplets, ainsi que
de celle des enche`res, afin de mettre en e´vidence les obstacles a` la coordination de
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la fourniture de biens publics par des me´canismes de marche´, pour montrer que le
choix du “Franchise bidding” n’est efficace que sous certaines conditions et que ce
mode de coordination n’est pas envisageable en toutes circonstances. A l’instar de
Crocker et Masten [1996] ou Yvrande-Billon [2004], nous insistons sur les caracte´-
ristiques tre`s spe´cifiques des contrats de concessions. Nous e´voquons en particulier
les hypothe`ses comportementales propres a` ce type de contrat (rationalite´ limite´e,
opportunisme), l’objet dont ce dernier rele`ve (pre´sence d’actifs spe´cifiques dans un
environnement incertain et complexe). Enfin, nous confrontons une contractuali-
sation incomple`te a` une contractualisation “pre´voyante”. D’ailleurs, nous traitons
le proble`me de la supervision de l’exe´cution du contrat de la concession ou, plus
ge´ne´ralement de la gestion de´le´gue´e, dans le cadre du mode`le de Calvo et Wellisz
[1978] . Ce dernier se re´ve`le eˆtre d’une grande aide pour comprendre la me´canique
des solutions incitatives qui peuvent eˆtre applique´es pour re´duire le risque potentiel
d’opportunisme chez le concessionnaire.
Dans la dernie`re partie du chapitre, nous pre´sentons le programme de construc-
tion des infrastructures en Pologne dans une optique e´largie du “Re´seaux Transeu-
rope´ens de Transports”. Nous regrettons le fait que l’axe de transport Est-Ouest
ne fasse pas partie des priorite´s de de´veloppement pour l’Union Europe´enne (UE)
dans les anne´es a` venir.
Nos re´flexions sur le concept du PPP nous permettent de prolonger le de´bat
sur la participation du secteur prive´ dans les domaines d’activite´ dont la fourniture
et la gestion, tout comme les retraites, les pensions ou les services de la sante´, ont
e´te´ historiquement assure´es par l’Etat. Dans le quatrie`me chapitre de la the`se,
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nous nous inte´ressons a` ce dernier domaine en proposant une analyse approfondie
de la re´forme du syste`me de sante´ en Pologne.
Contrairement a` la plupart des pays en de´veloppement, les pays en transition
avaient un secteur social de´ja` bien de´veloppe´ avant que la mutation ne commence.
Leurs filets de se´curite´ sociale couvraient les meˆmes risques que les re´gimes d’assu-
rance maladie et les programmes de transferts en vigueur dans les pays de´veloppe´s.
De plus, des ressources tre`s substantielles e´taient alloue´es aux soins de sante´ et a`
l’e´ducation. En revanche, les structures institutionnelles qui garantissaient une pro-
tection universelle “du berceau a` la tombe” avaient e´te´ conc¸ues pour un syste`me
e´conomique radicalement diffe´rent. Incompatibles avec les me´canismes d’incitation
propres a` une e´conomie de marche´ et mal pre´pare´es a` supporter les pressions lie´es
au passage vers ce type d’e´conomie, les institutions et les politiques sociales en
place ont e´te´ fortement mises a` mal par le processus de transition.
La mise en place d’un nouveau syste`me de soins de sante´ efficace, e´quitable,
accessible et attentif aux couˆts est une taˆche difficile pour tout pays, et plus encore
pour ceux en transition. En effet, depuis plus d’une de´cennie, ces pays s’efforcent
a` mettre en œuvre une re´forme des soins de sante´. Meˆme si les progre`s ont e´te´
lents et partiels, quelques changements importants ont e´te´ apporte´s ces dernie`res
anne´es. Pour que ces actions se re´ve`lent efficaces, il faudrait que les mentalite´s et
les habitudes e´voluent, non seulement chez les praticiens, mais aussi dans le public.
Tout cela demande du temps. Ne´anmoins, les gouvernements de ces pays, y com-
pris la Pologne, ont reconnu l’importance de l’assurance-maladie prive´e, qui devrait
constituer une composante majeure d’un futur syste`me de sante´ efficace. L’e´mer-
gence des couvertures-maladie prive´es va de pair avec une croissance soutenue de la
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classe moyenne, qui est preˆte a` consacrer une partie de ses revenus disponibles a` des
mutuelles-sante´ comple´mentaires. Les pouvoirs publics peuvent y voir un moyen
de comple´ter les financements publics qui permettraient d’accroˆıtre la capacite´ du
syste`me de sante´, ou de re´aliser d’autres objectifs de la politique de sante´, tels que
la responsabilisation des individus relativement au financement des soins.
Il est important de souligner que la mise en place d’un nouveau syste`me d’assu-
rance-maladie est un de´fi tre`s complexe, ne´cessitant des moyens financiers et tech-
niques conside´rables. Toutefois, nous pensons qu’une e´tude pre´alable relative a`
l’estimation de la demande d’assurance-sante´ prive´e permettrait de mieux e´valuer
les besoins de la population et de simuler les conse´quences des politiques e´cono-
miques diverses.
Ce dernier chapitre commence avec une bre`ve description de l’actuel syste`me
de sante´ en Pologne. Afin d’examiner les facteurs qui influencent le choix d’un
fournisseur de services me´dicaux, notre cadre d’analyse e´conomique est base´ sur
le mode`le de la demande pour les soins me´dicaux, dont l’utilisateur est amene´ a`
faire le choix entre le service public et son alternative prive´e (mode`le de Goddard
et Smith [1998]). Avec cette spe´cification-la`, nous avons la possibilite´ d’observer
l’impact de plusieurs facteurs (revenu, prix, qualite´) sur l’arbitrage du demandeur
entre les services de sante´ publics et son alternative prive´e. Nous avons aussi la
possibilite´ d’e´valuer le roˆle de l’Etat comme prestataire des soins : en de´termi-
nant des failles dans le syste`me, nous pouvons constater si le secteur prive´ en est
comple´mentaire ou substituable.
Nous utilisons la base des donne´es “ Social diagnosis : objective and subjective
quality of life in Poland”, fournie par Le Conseil Polonais de Monitoring Social.
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Cette base renferme des donne´es d’enqueˆtes-me´nages extreˆmement riches sur les
revenus, le logement, l’e´ducation ou la sante´ par exemple. Elle contient aussi des
appre´ciations individuelles sur la qualite´ de vie en Pologne. La partie “ Sante´” est
exhaustive, ce qui nous permet de de´terminer - entre autres - le nombre de fois ou`
l’individu a eu recours aux soins me´dicaux, de quel type de soins il s’agissait, qui
financ¸aient ces soins, quelles e´taient les raisons pour lesquelles l’individu se voyait
oblige´ de renoncer aux soins, quel est le poids des de´penses de sante´ dans les bud-
gets familiaux. La me´thodologie utilise´e est celle du mode`le de logit multinomial.
Parmi des nombreux atouts que repre´sente cette spe´cification, nous appre´cions son
aspect dynamique. Conjugue´ a` nos donne´es de´taille´es, nous pouvons alors de´ter-
miner si l’utilisation des services prive´s e´tait la conse´quence de l’utilisation de ces
soins dans le passe´. De meˆme, nous pouvons aussi savoir si la demande pour un soin
particulier prive´ est ” dope´e ” par la demande pour les services comple´mentaires.
Les re´sultats de notre e´tude re´ve`lent un inte´reˆt conside´rable de la part de l’en-
semble de la population pour les services me´dicaux prive´s. Cette forte demande
s’explique par les faiblesses du syste`me public, qui se heurte a` l’insuffisance des
moyens financiers. Or, cette situation, parfois pre´caire, est a` l’origine des listes d’at-
tentes pour les soins spe´cialise´s, qui ne peuvent plus eˆtre dispense´s, faute d’e´qui-
pements et de personnel. Nous constatons que les soins prive´s sont de plus en plus
sollicite´s parce qu’ils sont disponibles imme´diatement. Le prix ne constitue pas une
barrie`re d’acce`s aux soins et ce, meˆme pour les patients avec des revenus modestes.
Bien que les services me´dicaux prive´s soient ple´biscite´s, les patients se montrent
tre`s sceptiques par rapport a` des assurances-sante´ comple´mentaires. Il nous semble
que les futures pistes de la politique gouvernementale vont s’orienter vers un “pa-
nier” de soins gratuits pour tous, et son comple´ment payant pour les interventions
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spe´cialise´es. Cependant, pour qu’un tel syste`me fonctionne, il est ne´cessaire d’avoir
des assurances-sante´ de´veloppe´es et accessibles a` tous les patients, meˆme aux plus
de´munis. Finalement, aucune ame´lioration n’est possible sans qu’une hausse des
revenus du personnel de sante´ ne soit garantie. Le nouvel environnement sans fron-
tie`res au sein de l’Union Europe´enne pourrait provoquer - si ce n’est pas de´ja` le
cas - un reflux massif des professions me´dicales vers le pays ou` les salaires sont
beaucoup plus e´leve´s.
∗∗∗
Apre`s le de´bat doctrinal sur les visions de l’Etat dans le chapitre pre´liminaire,
nous abordons - de manie`re objective et consensuelle a` la fois - le fonctionnement de
l’Etat a` l’e´poque de la transition. En prenant l’exemple de Pologne, nous montrons,
a` trois reprises (chapitres 2 a` 4), l’action publique face au marche´ et aux besoins de
citoyens, avant d’apporter des e´le´ments de conclusion et d’e´voquer quelques pistes
de recherche.
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Chapitre 1
Reconciliation between market
and competition : letting the
State intervene
“[L’Etat] a` qui l’on demande de fournir de fac¸on effective un cadre a` l’inte´rieur
duquel peuvent se former les ordres autoge´ne´re´s. Loin de plaider pour un tel “Etat
minimal”, il nous apparaˆıt hors de doute que dans une socie´te´ e´volue´e le gouverne-
ment doive se servir de son pouvoir fiscal pour assurer un certain nombre de services
qui, pour diverses raisons, ne peuvent eˆtre fournis, du moins ade´quatement, par le
marche´.” (Friedrich von Hayek [1983], p.167)
“Collectivism - the belief that the state knows better than the market, and can im-
prove on the spontaneous tendencies of civil society, if necessary by suppressing
them - has been the most egregious error of the twentieth century ... My contention
is that this belief in the superior wisdom of the state breeds pathologies which de-
form, and at the limit destroy, the political economies based on it.” (Lord Skidelsky
[1995], preface, p.xiii)
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1.1 Introduction
M
any scholars agree that transition as a sui generis problem is over in Cen-
tral Europe. This does not mean, however, that all transition economies
are already in a state of bliss. In some, particularly successful states like Poland,
a lot of work needs to be done to make them prosperous.
While economic literature on transition put much attention on privatization
and market’s liberalization issue, much less voices underlined the role of the state
in transformation processes. The evidence is that in those countries the state had to
reduce its role as entrepreneur and financier. This was necessary, but not sufficient.
Private monopolies can be as inefficient, abusive and disrespectful of public inter-
ests as state monopolies, particularly when the law is unclear, regulators pliable
and politicians cooperative.
In Western economics there is a consensus on the minimum responsibilities of
the state : law, order and safeguard of justice across generations and all segments
of society. This includes healthcare, education, physical infrastructure and the
pension system. Beyond that, there is wide scope for ideology and party-line disa-
greement. Some very dynamic and successful economies, such as the Scandinavian
countries, have an institutional framework that assigns much more than the mini-
mum to the state. Compared to the United States, European states take a greater
responsibility in all these domains and “do a reasonable job”(Gros et al.[2004]).
Utilities or physical infrastructure are not predestined to be better managed in the
private sector. They can be mismanaged in either.
Nowadays only few deny the necessity of public intervention in economy. Simi-
larly, few deny the necessity of markets and competition. Therefore, the best way
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seems to be a mix of public/private ingredients in economic policy.
This first chapter of our dissertation will provide readers with economic theory
concerning reasons of public intervention in economy. The main aim is to set out
the economic theory of state intervention, with particular emphasis on why inter-
vention might foster efficiency, affect social justice and influence on overall welfare.
1.2 Motives of public intervention
1.2.1 Intervention for reasons of efficiency
Types of intervention
The state can intervene in four ways : regulation, finance, public goods provi-
sion, which all involve direct interference in the market mechanism ; and income
transfers, which may have indirect effects.
– Regulation
Governments can regulate the price, quantity and quality of products sold
by for-profit firms, as well as the inputs required for production. In principle,
regulators could affect all markets to operate optimally. The large number
of violations and their geographical distribution would require regulators to
be active throughout the economy, from the goods-producing industries to
diverse services delivered in numerous establishments and localities. Howe-
ver, regulation does not affect the firms’ objectives, and usually affects their
incentives only through the acquisition of information (continuously, perio-
dically, or through random sampling, such as unscheduled inspections) to
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set price, quantity and quality standards. Regulators face a severe handi-
cap of asymmetric information relative to the regulated firms. For example,
to control market power, regulators need to know almost everything that
concerns costs and production of every regulated firm. To deal with the in-
formation condition, regulators must not only know what companies actually
do, but also why they do what they do, and how else they could operate.
To be carried out, the regulatory function effectively requires a daunting
amount of information, a large number of expert regulators to gather and
analyze the information, as well as a cadre of regulators’ counterparts in
firms. These heavy and often unattainable requirements limit considerably
the effectiveness of the state’s regulatory functions in many instances where
it might be needed.
– Finance
Finance involves subsidies (or taxes) applied to the prices of specific commo-
dities or affecting the incomes of individuals. Price subsidies affect economic
activity by changing the slope of the budget constraint facing individuals and
firms. They can be partial (e.g. public transport, local-authority housing for
low-income part of population) or total (e.g. free pharmaceutical drugs for
elderly war’s combatants).
– Public good provision
As exposed in Stiglitz [2006], one of the reasons why public goods1 are typi-
cally provided in the public sector is that if there is no public sector provision,
then there will be an under-supply. Similarly, one of the standard arguments
why private goods are provided by the private sector is that if markets are
1For detailed description, please consult Box no.1 at the end of this chapter.
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working well, then the market provision of those goods is efficient. However,
it is important to emphasize that, generally, there is a market failure whene-
ver a public good is involved. The reason why no adequate supply of these
goods is available is often formulated as the free-rider problem :
...if I cannot be excluded from the non-rivalrous benefit of the
publicly available good, why should I pay ? I shall free-ride on the
provision of others. Since everyone has an incentive to free-ride,
there is a strong tendency towards under-provision of public goods
(Touffut et al.[2006]).
The state’s role in providing public goods is also concerned with the pro-
vision of collective-action components. Since other actors are also involved
in delivering of these components, the question is whether it is possible to
discern any specificity of state’s role in public good provision. It seems that
the state’s role differs from that of other actors in at least three important
respects. First, the state typically supports a diverse range of public goods.
At least in democratic nations, the state is the institution expected to faci-
litate - through electoral and legislative processes - an aggregation of social
preferences, including a bundling of the preferences of different population
groups for various public goods. In contrast, other actors tend to intervene
on a more issue-specific basis. This is not necessarily to make the government
provide a public good that they prefer, but to ensure that the public goods
to which they attach high priority also rank high on the government’s list
of issues to be promoted. Secondly, being the “laws’ guard” and making the
state responsible for establishing norms give a very special coercive role to
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the state. Non-state actors can engage in self regulation, or they can help
promote consensus around ceratin norms (Cutler et al. [1999]). In order to
make such norms compulsory and enforceable, however, they ultimately have
to rely on the state and its regulatory powers. Finally, state agencies may
be better-suited provider where the delivery of public good is difficult to
observe (the quality of education imparted to students, for instance) and,
hence, difficult to monitor, verify and contract out. Government, as well as
non-state, non-profit organizations, may also have an advantage over private,
profit-seeking providers, where opportunities for pecuniary rewards are limi-
ted, and where the provision of the good may depend more on workers being
motivated by social concerns. On the other hand, where a task is unidimen-
sional and calls for innovation and entrepreneurship, private provision may
be preferable (Kaul [2003]).
– Income transfers.
Income transfers can be tied to specific types of expenditure (e.g. education
vouchers) or untied (e.g. social-security benefits). These transfers take the
form of a lump sum, and therefore affect economic activity by changing the
incomes of the individuals, with no extra-market effect on product or factor
prices.
The assumptions under which markets are efficient
Economic efficiency (Pareto efficiency) is about making the best use of limited
resources given people’s tastes. It involves the choice of an output bundle
X∗ = (X1, X2, ..., XN) (1.1)
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where Xi is the output of the ith good with the property that any deviation
from these quantities will make at least one person worse off. The “invisible hand
theorem” asserts that the market clearing set of outputs, XM , will automatically
be the efficient output bundle X∗ in equation (1.1) if and only if a number of
assumptions hold. These assumptions concerns perfect competition, the absence
of market failures and perfect information. When all these assumption hold there
is no justification for intervention for efficiency reasons, but if one or more fails the
resulting market equilibrium may be inefficient, and the state intervention in one
of the forms described above may be appropriate.
– Perfect competition
Perfect competition must hold in product and factor markets as well as in
capital markets. The assumption has two essential features : economic agents
must be price-takers and they must have equal power. Price-taking implies
free entry and exit into/from an industry with a large number of consu-
mers and firms, none of whom is able to influence market prices. Where this
assumption fails (e.g. in the case of monopoly), intervention involves regula-
tion, like price ceiling, or an appropriate mix of taxation and subsidy. Equal
power is violated by any difference in the ability of individuals to choose
their consumption. When this assumption fails, solutions, if they exist, are
also based on regulation.
– No market failures
Markets “fail” when it is possible to make one person better off without
making someone else worse off, thus indicating some degree of inefficiency.
In economics parlance, Pareto optimality has not been achieved. “No market
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failures” assumption can be violated in three major ways : public goods,
external effects and increasing return to scale.
- In addition to what we have said before about public goods, Kaul [2003]
suggests that the state should correct this market failure because it is
rare that another actor can match the government’s financial alloca-
tions to public goods. Its special financial role is linked to its unique
coercive powers, including its power to tax and to take make, if deemed
desirable, everyone contribute to its expenditure programmes. On the
other hand, as claimed by Winston [2006], governments “fail” when an
economic intervention proves to be unwarranted, either because markets
are performing adequately or public policy does not correct a market
failure efficiently. In such cases, government intervention may actually
exacerbate a problem or produce unintended negative result.
- External effects arise when an act of individual A (that is to say his pro-
duction or consumption) reduces the welfare of individual B, for which
no compensation or payment from A to B takes place. The effect of
externalities is to create a divergence between private and social costs
and benefits. Literature has proven that the market can resolve this
inefficiency itself. Coase [1960] shows that, where the law assigns unam-
biguous and enforceable property rights, the externality problem can be
solved by negotiation between the parties concerned. But this is not al-
ways possible. For instance, in the case of air pollution (property rights
are not enforceable), state intervention may be justified by an appro-
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priate tax (referred to as Pigovian tax) on the activity generating the
external cost. (Stiglitz)
- Increasing returns to scale. This situation occurs when doubling all inputs
leads to increase more than twice the output. In this case, the compe-
titive analysis of market behavior breaks down for two reasons : (i) the
industry would end up as monopoly, and (ii) the private sector could
not profitably sustain marginal cost pricing. If the state does not inter-
vene, the society suffers the welfare loss, but gains whatever innovative
advantages the monopoly might have due to its size. On the other hand,
the state can regulate the monopoly by prescribing its price or rate of
return. The state can also operate the monopoly as a public company.
– Perfect information
The analytical key is the twofold literature on imperfect information. One
strand analyzes the effects of imperfect information about quality : consu-
mers might be badly informed (e.g. about the quality of a car), so might
producers (e.g. about the the riskiness of an applicant for insurance). The
second strand, imperfect information about price, covers topics like search
theory and reservation wages2. In the case of imperfect information, several
solutions are possible : the market itself may develop institutions to supply
information (e.g. consumer magazines) or the state may respond with regu-
lations (hygiene laws in the case of food). Where information problems are
serious the market might be so inefficient that public production may be a
better answer. As underlined by Barr [1992], individuals need perfect infor-
2The quality literature has its roots in seminal articles buy Arrow [1963] and Akerlof [1970].
For a detailed survey of this literature see Stiglitz [1987] ; for a survey of the literature on imperfect
price information see Mortensen [1986].
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mation also about the future, so as to make rational choices over time. The
market can fight against uncertainty through the mechanism of insurance.
But private insurance can be inefficient or impossible, largely because of in-
formation problems in insurance markets. Thus some risks are not insurable
(e.g. unemployment) . In such cases public funding may increase efficiency.
1.2.2 State and Services of General Interest’s provision
(SGI)
As it was mentioned above, there is a consensus that the state should pro-
vide public goods. In Europe, the role of states results from conceptual heritage of
XIX th century. In the case of service network industries, public intervention was
imposed when reality abundantly revealed the deficiencies of the market. Thus in
the inter-war and post-Second-World-War periods, public organization of networks
into natural monopolies was put in place within national frameworks, each accor-
ding to its culture and the principles forged by economic theory (Allais, Boiteux...).
SGIs as essential services at the level of public goods
Our societies consider certain services (human activities based on a person-to-
person relation) as essential for individuals, communal life or development. Chris-
tianity elaborated a notion of the common good necessary for the flourishing of
the person. Humanism in France led to a notion of public service, a doctrine and
duty of the state (Duguit [1921]). In Germany, Daseinsvorsorge is based on social
philosophy. Amartya Sen [1984] renews this heritage in designating certain services
(education, health) as necessary for individuals to exercise their freedom in a so-
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ciety.
There is no general definition of public goods that is accepted in the area of SGIs.
Nevertheless, Herzog [2003] stresses that the conception of a public good always
appeals to the principles of non-market exchange (sharing, solidarity), whether
mixed or not with the principles of market exchange. In current debates, two di-
mensions of SGIs are often emphasized : (i) economic - the activities involved have
increasing returns. The more service is provided on the network (infrastructure),
the more unit costs diminish ; (ii) social - equal access and universal inclusion ne-
cessitate rebalancing, from the inexpensive zones to the expensive ones.
SGIs are services for which there exist markets, but for which there are also speci-
fic obligations of public services. Theses specific obligations require a supervisory
public authority. Two types of SGI can be distinguished : those that can be pro-
vided by private operators that are subject to regulation, and those that are more
difficult to provide through markets, in particular when a situation of natural mo-
nopoly persists : the cost of production is less when it is evaluated by a single firm
because of significant fixed costs/network activities or because there are signifi-
cant network effects (positive externalities). Then the problem is that the pricing
structure chosen by the monopoly is higher than effective marginal cost pricing.
Thus, either marginal cost pricing can be imposed, and the monopoly subsidized
(running the risk of no incentive to rationalize) or, a second-level optimum with
average cost pricing can be chosen. Finally, a system of cross-subsidies can be put
in place between those services.
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Financing SGIs
In most network SGIs, the existence of a natural monopoly leads to the sepa-
ration of the network activity from the management and use of networks that can
be provided by competing private operators. The cost of this separation is the risk
of bad coordination between the network manager and the service providers, the
difficulty of defining network access pricing and arbitrating between insufficient
competition among service providers (prices are too high) and excessive competi-
tion (investments are too low). As remarked by Artus [2006], one should consider
the financial problems linked to the provision of SGIs. These are of two sorts :
(i) which of SGIs should be provided by the state and which of SGIs should be
market-provided ; (ii) Modern SGIs require considerable infrastructure investment
(utilities, health). These investments are increasingly financed by public-private
partnerships (PPP). Thus, is PPPs’ development desirable ? Although there are
no simple answers to these questions, it is important, however, to underline the role
of state financial institutions, namely state banks, which enjoy state guarantees
for SGIs’ financing.
An overview of the concept of SGI under EU law
The European Union Treaty does not include as a Community objective the
provision or the organization or the financing of SGIs, and therefore does not as-
sign specific and explicit powers to the Community in the area of SGIs. Except for
a sector-specific reference in the area of transport3, services of general economic
interest (SGEI) are referred to in Articles 16 and Article 86(2) EC. Furthermore,
3See Art 73 TEU.
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according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the EU
recognizes and respects access to SGEIs, in order to promote the social and terri-
torial cohesion of the Union4. Although Article 16 EC confers responsibility upon
the Community and the member States to ensure, each within their respective
sphere of competencies, that their policies enable SGEIs to fulfill their missions, it
does not provide the Community with specific means of action. On the other hand,
Article 86(2) EC implicitly recognizes the right of the Member States to assign spe-
cific public-service obligations to economic operators. It manifests a fundamental
principle ensuring that SGEIs can continue to be provided and developed in the
common market. The concept of SGIs is a surrogate notion of the SGEI. However,
its remit is broader and covers both market and non-market services which the
public authorities regard as being of general interest and subject to specific public
service obligations by virtue of general interest criterion. It thus covers certain
services provided by the big network industries such as transport, postal services,
energy and communications, but also extends to any other economic activity which
is subjected to public service obligations5. The economic nature of SGIs is reflec-
ted in the Community’s attempts to achieve a gradual opening of the markets for
large network industries such as telecommunications, electricity, gas and transport
in which SGIs can be provided. The Community has adopted a comprehensive
regulatory framework for these services, which specifies public service obligations
at European level and includes aspects such as universal service, consumer and
user rights, health and safety concerns.
4See Art 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
5The term “public service obligations” denotes specific requirements that are imposed by
public authorities on the provider of the service in order to ensure that certain public interest
objectives are met, for instance, in the matter of air, rail and road transport, and energy. For a
detailed description see Bremond [2003].
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1.2.3 Intervention for reasons of social justice
Economic literature sets out broad explanations of why redistribution occurs.
To libertarians it is enforced on the rich by the voting power of the poor (Downs
[1957], Tullock [1970]). Since the income distribution in most countries contains re-
latively few people with high incomes and many with lower incomes, governments
maximize votes by redistributing from the rich who, in turn, gain the votes of those
with lower incomes. The logic of the argument is that the system will redistribute
towards equality. On the other hand, utilitarians argue (Hochman and Rodgers
[1969] that the rich may choose out of altruistic motives to vote for political par-
ties which propose to tax them more heavily to finance redistributive policies.
As there is no clear and constructive consensus on redistribution questions (cash
or in kind), we only point out the implication of those literature on tax policies.
Neither we develop the discussion between socialist and “Rawlsians” on equality of
redistribution.
1.2.4 Public choice and government failure
Public choice literature addresses four explanations of the extent and growth in
government activity. In addition to the “market failure ” breakdown and income-
distributor roles, public choice literature analyzes the response of government to
the electorate in the form of coalitions of voters or trough pressure groups, and the
role of bureaucrats. The government-failure arguments point to the latter two as
important distorting influences. The essence of the argument is that government
actions are based on self-interest rather than on maximizing social welfare.
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The influence of the electorate operates in various ways. Buchanan and Tullock
[1962] and Tullock [1971] argue that most transfers from the rich are captured by
the middle class through their electoral power as median voters or acting as inter-
est groups. Interest groups use their lobbying power to bring about redistribution
also through regulation. It is argued that regulators are frequently “captured” by
those whom they are supposed to regulate (Stigler [1971], Posner [1975], Pelzmann
[1976]). According to this view, regulation is an entry barrier which allows the ex-
traction of monopoly rent. Distortions can arise also within government. Public
agencies may partly be run for the benefit of the bureaucrats who run them (Nis-
kanen [1971]). This occurs because politicians cannot fully monitor the actions
of utility-maximizing officials. These insights, however, should not be overstated.
For instance, regulation may result in monopoly rents but, as discussed in 1.1.2
section, it also serves to protect imperfectly informed consumers. The power of bu-
reaucrats can be overstated and their motivation misunderstood (Dunlevay [1985]).
Finally, organizational slack may be pronounced where the state rather regulates
private activity than public production (for instance, countries where private, fee-
for-service medical care is publicly funded find it more difficult to contain costs
than those with public production).
1.2.5 The issue of privatization
The majority of scholars agree that the concept of privatization is not simple.
A good can be financed publicly or privately, and it can be produced in either sec-
tor. Traditionally, we can mark out four situations. Goods like food are generally
produced and financed by private sector. At the other extreme, most school educa-
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tion is produced publicly and financed by taxes. There are two intermediate cases
left ; for instance, public transport is produced in the public sector but financed
by charges on the private sector. Finally, some goods might be produced priva-
tely and sold to the public sector (e.g. healthcare services). This simplified vision,
unfortunately, cannot be of much use. In reality, markets are never purely private
(e.g. food is subjected to quality regulation and its price might be distorted by
subsidies). Furthermore, food may be freely provided (e.g. free school meals). Nor
are many pure cases of free public provision (e.g. drug prescription). To clarify the
situation, we propose to distinguish : (i) in which sector production takes place,
(ii) which sector finances it, and (iii) the influence of regulation on decisions about
production and consumption. These are illustrated in the Table 1.
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Tab. 1.1 – A view of public and private provision
Type of allocation Production Regulation Finance Examples
Decision about Decision about
production individual consumption
1 2 3 4
Pure private Private Private Food purchased out, non-transfer income
Private market + state finance Private Public Overall consumption of privately- produced
goods purchased out of transfer income,
Medicare in the US
Private market + regulation
(i) regulation of individual consumption Private Public Private Mandatory automobile insurance
(ii) regulation of total supply Private Public Private Healthcare in Canada
Private production, state regulation
and finance
(i) supply wholly private Private Public Private Education vouchers
(ii) total supply determined be state Private Public Public Inputs for public healthcaare
and national defence
Public production, private allocation
and finance
(i) total supply determined by private demand Public Private Private Public transport
(ii) supply wholly public Public Private Public Complimentary healthcare
Public apart from private finance Public Public Public Mandatory civil insurance
Public apart from private consumption decision Public Public Private Public Post-compulsory education
Pure public Public Public National defence
Source : Barr [1998], p.96
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As we can see, libertarians would favor private production under column (1),
producer and consumer sovereignty under columns (2) and (3), and private finance
under column (4). They would therefore choose row 1 or, failing that, the private
market underwritten by income transfers, shown in row 2. Thus, privatization can
be seen as an upward movement in the table from a lower line to a higher.
The privatization issue takes a completely new dimension in the transition
and/or development countries.
Privatization process in transition countries
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the start of market-oriented re-
forms in many former socialist countries (FSC) of Central and Eastern Europe,
the prospect of privatizing inefficient state-owned companies figured prominently
in both popular and academic writings6. The economic program of the first post-
communist governments addressed privatization issues in the context of the crea-
tion of market institution which had stood the test of time in Western economies.
As Stressed by Andreff [2005], four objectives were assigned to FSC privatiza-
tion programmes :
1. Systemic change through new ownership arrangements ;
2. Social objectives : privatization should be welfare-improving in redistributing
the existing wealth across the population ;
3. Economic efficiency : privatization is supposed to increase economic effi-
ciency, both market allocative efficiency and X-efficiency in firm organization
and management ;
6For a detailed review of privatization literature see Gouret [2007]. For an overall assessment
of privatization in transition countries see Nellis [2002]
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4. financial targets : selling state assets serves to finance social expenditures
and new pension plans and reduces the fiscal deficit.
Thus, the main privatization goal was of systemic character : to contribute to
the change of the economic system through creation of private entities. Within the
framework of this goal, a number of sub-goals existed, of which the most important
was the creation of well-functioning markets, including a securities market. Apart
from this purely systemic role, privatization’s goal was to solve the problem of
microeconomic efficiency of state-owned enterprises ; this in turn, contribute to
the rise in productivity of the whole enterprise sector. Although never officially
formulated, there was another goal, of crucial importance : to make the whole
reform process smooth, stable and irreversible. Privatization was expected to create
not only incentives for economic development, but also create powerful pro-reform
lobby of actors, involved in privatization process and using its results. Finally,
privatization was viewed as a tool for solving a wide set of social problems. On the
one hand, attempts were made to attain a kind of social justice (via distribution
of part of the privatized stock among the whole population and, additionally, by
creating preferences for certain groups who were felt to deserve such entitlements).
Sometimes, attempts were made to use privatization to resolve the social problems
in concrete enterprises by imposing on the buyers some obligations concerning
employment, wages, etc.
It should be remembered, however, that as soon as privatization has more than
one objective, it is doomed to fail. Andreff [2005] strongly underlines :
“The Timbergen theorem has demonstrated that, for any economic
policy to be efficient, it must encompass exactly as many objectives as
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the policy tools at hand. If economic efficiency were the objective, FSC
policy makers should have foregone fiscal and socio-political objectives.
If the target is to bail out the State budget, then forget economic
efficiency and political issues. If the priority is withdrawal of former
communist managers, then give up any economic objective.” (p.196)
Thus, the “tool-objective”matching is linked to the mode of privatization. Practi-
cally speaking, only mass, non-equivalent privatization can guarantee rapid, radical
changes in the formal ownership structure of the economy. On the other hand, ho-
wever, this model of privatization carries the risk of weak corporate governance
and has definitely no opportunity to inflate fiscal receipts. Privatization designers
reach a fiscal or financial objective better with asset sales, but they cannot create
widespread popular shareholding. If they avoid share sales, they will have to main-
tain insider control over the enterprise.
Another important dilemma concerning privatization procedures is the pace of
privatization. If fast privatization fulfills the equity, its effects on restructuring
are usually insignificant. In contrast, a slower pace of privatization processes may
result in more efficient corporate structure. At the same time, however, slower
privatization may be arrested by political decisions before its completion.
1.2.6 Drawing the borderlines between state and markets
We have seen before the efficiency arguments for state intervention. We have
seen also the government failure counter-arguments. Markets can be efficient or
inefficient ; so can governments. Thus market failure is a counterpoint to govern-
ment failure. This conclusion is crucial for policy goals. Therefore, it is important
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to make a clear distinction between the aims of policy and the methods to achieve
them. Aims include social justice and economic efficiency (the definition of social
justice varies with different theories of society while economic efficiency has broadly
the same meaning in all theories of society). Methods embrace income transfers
and direct intervention in the market through regulation, finance and public pro-
duction. The resulting form of economic organization, at one extreme, is the free
market (with or without redistribution) and, at the other, central planning and
public production of all basic goods and services. In between, there are different
types of mixed economy involving both private markets (with or without interven-
tion in the form of regulation and finance) and public production.
Whatever literature might say about the distinction between state and markets it
is clear that this frontier deteriorates. As a result, there has been a rapid world-
wide spread of New Public Management movement since the late 80s. as well as
a constant growth in New Institutional Economics literature. Both focus on the
efficiency goals and emphasize the crucial role of a choice of (possibly the best)“go-
vernance structure” for a given type of transaction 7. Thus, “Make-or-Buy”decision
becomes the central criterion about resource allocation.
1.3 State and Market Transition
Adam Smith’s thesis that the natural human propensity to “truck, barter and
exchange” would automatically lead to market exchange system has been empiri-
cally rejected by reformers in transition countries. Thus, an effective government
is a necessary condition for successful systemic changes.
7For a detailed exposition of NIE-related issues see Me´nard [2005]. For NPM literature review
see Reichard et al.[1998]
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The first reason for active role of the state is that voluntary transactions cannot
take place in an institutional vacuum. A market economy cannot exist without
effective legal, administrative and regulatory institutions maintained by the state.
Institutions are needed to perform, at a minimum, the following functions :
- to define property rights,
- to enact a system of laws,
- to enforce contracts,
- to collect taxes,
- to oversee banks,
- to promote and preserve competition,
- to provide entrepreneurs with information that reduces uncertainty, cuts tran-
saction costs and secures private sector confidence in making investment
decisions,
- to provide a legal framework such as the disputes between agents can be resolved
within. Such institutions provide stability and certainty necessary for facili-
tating efficient economic transactions. Historically, the creation of national
markets coincided with the constitution and expansion of such state institu-
tions in the West. Late developers in the Third World often failed to create
functioning market systems and thereby resorted to interventionist regimes
not because their governments were too “strong” but rather because their
governments were too “weak”. A weak state could be very intrusive, but at
the same time, it could hamper to construct effective legal and regulatory
institutions.
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“There is no evidence that under conditions of administrative weak-
ness it is harder to create and regulate functioning national markets
in goods, labor and finance than it is for government to manage
the bulk of production itself.” Chaudry [1993], p.253
In this sense, simply shrinking the state will not produce the efficient market
systems. To create competitive markets, new state institutions must be established
and strengthened to perform the task of indirect regulation and administration,
which is much more delicate and difficult than direct control.
Market institutions cannot spring up automatically. Some people believe that
market institutions would spontaneously emerge from voluntary transactions bet-
ween economic agents if the state stands aside. This has never happened before and
we have no reason to believe that it is going to happen now. Market institutions,
in a sense, represent the essential minimum of public goods that must be provi-
ded if markets are going to work at all (Garnaut [1991]). Since they are public
goods, people are unlikely to cooperate voluntarily with one another to provide
them, just as they would not in regard to the provision of other kinds of public
goods. It is clear that if the state does not provide market institutions, private
economic agents would have to develop some informal rules to stem uncertainty
and introduce some level of predictability into commercial transactions. In the
absence of state intervention, however, these arguments are likely to evolve into
pacts neglecting the interests of consumers and small producers, and reflect only
the preferences of those who enjoy economic power. Thus, thought as public goods,
market institutions initially have to brought about by non-economic forces.
Even after the establishment of market institutions, the state still cannot stand
aside. Individuals have incentives to break rules, to corrupt the legal basis of market
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exchange, to collude in anti-competitive ways, to misrepresent the nature of assets
which are the subject of contracts, etc. Enforcement costs of market-conforming
behavior can be extremely high. In countries where there are already cultural and
ideological support for self-restraint in maintaining the market rules, enforcement
of market-conforming behavior would be lower. However, in countries where the
market economy is still in the making, it is necessary to have more explicit, exten-
sive and expensive enforcement of the rules by a strong state.
One has to remember also that the market transition is rather a conflictual than
consensual process. As indicated above, the market economy is not just embedded
in state institutions, it also has its ideological and moral basis, which is what
the economy in transition is lacking. Neoclassic economists’ assumption about
the human motivation may enable them to generate sophisticated models, but the
simple fact is, as Libenstein points out, people’s behavior has often been influenced
by habits, conventions, work ethics, partial calculation and inertia (Arndt [1988]).
When a great institutional change occurs, they often find it hard to adapt. In
the case of market transition, people would not accept market values and behave
according to market rules simply because the government has announced that their
country has adopted the model of market economy.
Furthermore, the market transition involves not only the transformation of
norms and values but also the redistribution of resources and power. The transition
may provide some social groups with opportunities of upward mobility, depriving
others of traditional privileges. The transition is also likely to create inequalities in
income and wealth that do not match existing patterns of entitlements, status and
power. In a nutshell, the transition tends to dislocate groups in both the political
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and the economical realms, which would inevitably give rise to social conflicts and
political struggle.
In former socialist countries transition to market economy, as many studies
have predicted,
“whatever their long-term consequences, in the short-run reforms are
likely to cause inflation, unemployment, and resource misallocation as
well as to generate volatile changes of relative income” (Przeworski
[1991]).
It implies that some people will gain much more than others. The issue is thus
who will get what, how much, when, and who will bear the costs. The government
of course can use its coercive power to impose the costs on certain social groups.
In order to have a relatively smooth transition, however, it is better for the state
to adopt measures alleviating transition pains by establishing new safety nets and,
doing so, compensating those whose interests are threatened by the reform. This is
a very expensive undertaking. The state has to be strong enough to amass sufficient
resources for redistribution.
1.4 Reforming the welfare state : unfinished bu-
siness of transition
Development of the new system in the transition countries over the past sixteen
years has been characterized by the lack of consistency between economic and social
reforms. While economic reforms were very much market-oriented and introduced
in a rather dramatic way, the social area has not been sufficiently defined. Major
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political circles and most eminent experts of the region believe that the socialist
welfare state should be improved, updated, but not eradicated or even excessively
constrained. A small group of policy makers and experts, usually with an economic
background, holds the view that the social policy should undergo complex reforms.
As remarked by Golinowska [2001], this is synonymous with transposing the old
slogan coined by the trade unions in the early 80s : “yes to socialism, no to distor-
tions” into “yes to the market, but no to the market distribution”. Nevertheless,
several major market-based institutional solutions were introduced in the social
security area at the turn of the millennium. The initial transition is sometimes re-
ferred to as “the state of reactive social reforms” (Horstmann et al.[2004]), a term
indicating a reaction to consequences of the departure from the doctrine of total
employment and labor market efficiency, as well as a reaction to the anticipated
increase in poverty. As a direct response to new social problems, an institutional
infrastructure for labor and social assistance was developed. In this reactive stage,
there were also spontaneous reactions, which moved the socialist welfare state in
the direction of privatization and commercialization. On the one hand, a crisis in
production and public expenditure reduced funds available for social services, and
on the other, the bias towards microeconomic efficiency compelled businesses to
limit social activities. However, policy makers and experts have never openly and
seriously discussed the new social policy model adjusted to evolving economy.
Welfare state reforms in post-communist countries are necessary. However, we
strongly claim that it is not possible to reject all the features of the former sys-
tem. This is mainly true from the social standpoint. It should be remembered that
socialist welfare state gave everybody a sense of security and peaceful existence
within the community of an enterprise, which despite of low wages managed to
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satisfy the basic needs of individuals. Furthermore, a co-existence of different per-
ceptions and assessments of the socialist welfare state led almost all countries of
the region to a conviction that it is possible to combine market economy with a
modified model of the socialist welfare state.
1.5 Conclusion
The transition, by definition, aims at gradually establishing the market as the
central mechanism of resource allocation. In the course of transition, however, we
should avoid what Galbraith calls “simplistic ideology” (Galbraith [1990]), what
Przeworski calls “neoliberal fallacy”(Przeworski [1992]), or what Kornai calls “un-
critical, mythical cult of the market” (Kornai [1992]). The market is not a panacea
for solving all socioeconomic problems. Morover, the market is not an end in itself.
It is rather just a means to promote social and individual welfare. For this reason,
the potential role of non-market means, including state intervention, in improving
welfare should be neither dismissed nor underestimated.
In this chapter we argued that active state engagement is necessary for facilita-
ting both transition and economic development. For those purposes every govern-
ment intervenes in economy by default or design. Contrary to neoclassical theory,
in real world, less government intervention does not always produce higher level
of welfare. On the other hand, public choice theorists prove that governments, like
markets, also fail, for reasons both intended and unforseen, leading to inefficient
outcomes.
In general, the assertion that the government can do better than the markets
is simply false. As described above, efficient market operation cannot be attained
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without government intervention. The fact that there may exist government poli-
cies that would increase the overall welfare, of course, does not necessarily create
a presumption that state intervention is always desirable. Especially, in the course
of transition from a central-planned economy to a market one, the role of the state
needs to be redefined. As pointed out by Stiglitz [1998], there should be a discussion
on “How are decisions about the role of the state made ?” Taking a look at what
happens not only in the former socialists states in Europe but also in the countries
of Eastern Asia, we have a strong impression that this debate has never taken place.
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1.6 Appendix
Box no.1 : Public goods
In economics, a public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This means :
consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce the amount of the good available
for consumption by others ; and no one can be effectively excluded from using that good. For
example, if one individual eats a cake, there is no cake left for anyone else, and it is possible to
exclude others from consuming the cake ; it is a rivalrous and excludable good, or a private good.
Conversely, breathing air does not significantly reduce the amount of air or water available to
others, nor can people be effectively excluded from using the air. This makes it a public good.
The term public good is often used to refer to goods that are non-excludable as well as non-rival.
This means it is not possible to exclude individuals from the good’s consumption. Fresh air may
be considered a public good as it is not generally possible to prevent people from breathing it.
However, technically speaking such goods should be called pure public goods. These are highly
theoretical definitions : in the real world there may be no such thing as an absolutely non-rival
or non-excludable good ; but economists think that some goods in the real world approximate
closely enough for these concepts to be meaningful.
Paul A. Samuelson is usually credited as the first economist to develop the theory of public
goods. In his classic 1954 paper “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” he defined a public
good, or as he called it in the paper a “collective consumption good”, as follows :
“...[goods] which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s
consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual’s
consumption of that good...”
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Chapitre 2
Regulation and Performance of
Electricity Distribution Utilities :
The Case of Poland
2.1 Introduction
E
lectricity restructuring has proven to be one of the more difficult exercises
in the process of economic transition and therefore has taken more effort and
more time than initially expected. In socialist countries the electricity sector was
assigned a prominent political and ideological role (“Lenin’s communism is Soviet
power plus electrification”, Cullmann et al.[2007], p.6). Subsequently, reforms to-
wards market-oriented structures were challenging : the price system was changed
from social tariffs to cost-covering prices ; vertically integrated monopolies were
unbundled while some portions became privatized ; regulatory authorities were es-
tablished ; environmental standards and renewable energy promotion schemes were
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implemented. In brief, the Est European transition countries undertook reforms
within a decade that had occupied their West European transition counterparts
for almost half a century.
Newbery [2004], Stern [1994] and Stern and Davis [1998] have provided evidence
on the economic regulatory and political challenges of restructuring the electricity
sector ; many of their observations are still valid. More recent evidence by EBRD
[2004] confirms that the electricity sector is still one of the unresolved legacies of
transition in many countries.
Together with high voltage transport and low voltage distribution of electricity,
regional electricity distribution retains many of the characteristics typical of a
natural monopoly (subadditive cost function). This implies that, contrary to elec-
tricity production and electricity retail, there can be no competition in electricity
distribution. It also gives the electricity sector an important role both in socia-
list systems and in market economies. Electricity distribution is perhaps the most
complicated element in restructuring, where industrial demand has collapsed at
the same time residential use is rising. Distribution is a political issue when pri-
cing or security becomes most sensitive for industrial and residential users. When
added to the natural monopolistic character of the sector, electricity companies
may discover they hold the upper hand in negotiations with state’s regulator du-
ring the time of transition.
Poland, by far the largest electricity producer and distributor among the East-
European transition countries still has substantial problems to resolve before it
can completely reform its electricity sector. Its historical dependance on coal - a
supply source that suffers from chronic over-employment, centralized bureaucratic
structure, and a high degree of political decision-making - has weakened moder-
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nization efforts. For example, to preserve employment in several mines, Poland
was forced to buy its own expensive coal. In socialist era, the electricity sector
was organized by a Central Ministry which delegated operational powers to one
electricity company in each of the 33 regions.
Until 1990, the whole electricity sector in Poland was owned by the State Treasury
and managed by the Energy and Brown Coal Authority. International transmission
interconnections were oriented to the East. In 1989 and 1990, the reform of this
structure and commercialization began. Regulatory functions were shifted from
the industry bodies to the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Trade (and later to
the Ministry of the Economy). Around 40 electricity generation firms were created
as joint stock companies as well as 33 distribution enterprises. Operational func-
tions relating to the grid and generation dispatch were vested in the Polish Power
Grid Company which became the ”single buyer” for the system. All the distribu-
tion companies have been privatized during the last three years (with the State’s
majority stake control) and nowadays, most of them are concentrated into capital
groups. The government plans to retain a strategic holding in distribution compa-
nies given their natural monopoly characteristic so as to be able to influence their
decisions in order to protect consumers. Regulation of the Polish energy sector is
fulfilled by the Energy Regulatory Authority (ERA). This regulatory body looks
after the implementation of the Tariff Ordinance of the Minister of Economy of
14 December 2000 setting forth the specific terms of determining and calculating
tariffs and terms of settlements for trading in electric energy. The tariffs are develo-
ped by entities engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution and trading in
electric energy, based upon the detailed rules provided in the relevant Ordinance
of the Minister of Economy. Tariff regulation for transmission and distribution
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services is based on regulatory approval of the unit cost of these services. In the
development of distribution and supply tariffs, the utilities submit data to ERA
on elements of expenditures for the past period (year t-1 ) and forecast of expen-
ditures and output (electricity distributed or supplied) for the projected period.
Although these data are essential, they are not really sufficient. The private ope-
rators control most of the specific information needed for regulatory purposes and
have no interest in volunteering their dissemination unless they have an incentive
to do so. That is why we believe that performance study is highly recommended.
As the the one of the key concerns of the literature on economic transition in
Eastern Europe is the link between economic reforms and productivity at the level
of firms, sectors and of national economies. Broadly speaking, one expects that the
move from central planning state ownership toward market competition and more
efficient corporate governance increases the productivity at all levels. Several stu-
dies confirm this hypothesis by applying recent methods of productivity analysis
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
For instance, Halpern et al. [2001] show that the Hungarian corporate sector in-
creasing competition has lead to a gradual improvement in efficiency and a shift
from decreasing to increasing returns to scale. Among others, Funke et al. [2001]
show that East German firms undergoing transition were significantly less efficient
than firms in Western Germany1. However, the past sixteen years have taught
us that not all expectations regarding the virtues of transition have materialized.
This is particularly true in the capital-intensive and highly politicized infrastruc-
1Similar studies using advanced quantitative methods include Brada et al. [1997] on Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary. Jones et al. [1998] on Bulgaria ; Piesse [2000] on Hungary and Koop et al.
[2000] on a comparison between the Polish and Western economies.
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ture sectors, where reforms have sometimes been slow and painful (EBRD [1996]).
The literature on restructuring’s impact on the electric sector’s productivity or
individual companies in the emerging internal energy markets in Europe is scarce.
For instance, Kocenda and Cabelka (1999) studied the liberalization of the energy
sector in the transition countries with respect to its effect on transition and growth.
Filippini et al. [2004] analyzed the efficiency distribution companies in Slovenia,
using a stochastic frontier analysis. They found that Slovenian distribution com-
panies were cost inefficient and that in the situation of increasing returns to scale
most utilities did not achieve the minimum efficient scale. Finally, Cullmann et al.
(2006) provide a cross-country efficiency analysis of regional electricity distribution
companies in four East European transition countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary and Poland). They found that the restructured Czech electricity distri-
bution companies regularly obtained the highest efficiency scores.
In this chapter, we estimate the level of technical efficiency of electricity dis-
tribution companies in Poland. Our aim is twofold : first, since the regulation
of utilities is based on simple price cap models, one would like to know whether
the regulated tariffs reflect the real performance expenses ; second, we want to
contribute to the current discussion in the literature on transition and producti-
vity. This chapter is structured in the following way : section 1 provides a brief
review of efficiency estimation methods and explains the specification used in this
study. Section 2 describes the data and section 3 presents the estimation results.
A discussion of the main results in section 6 conclude. Finally, as a complimentary
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issue, we treat the question of public service of electricity in the light of liberalizing
electricity environment.
2.2 Measuring Efficiency : Theoretical Framework
Efficiency analysis has played a crucial role in defining regulatory policies,
mainly in industries characterized by natural monopolies and/or by public owner-
ship. Examples are telecommunication (Uri [2001]), transport (Coelli et al.[1998,
2000], energy (Jamasb et al. [2001, 2003], schooling (Mizala et al. [2002], hospitals
(Steinmann et al. [2003]) and even museums (Bishop and Brand [2003] using a sto-
chastic analysis of museums in South Western England). Efficiency analysis is also
increasingly applied for other sector-specific analysis, such as farming (Latruffe
at al. [2004]), banking (Hauner [2005]), or the cement industry (Tsekouras et al.
[2005]). In the electricity sector - as we have mentioned before - efficiency analysis
has played a particularly important role in the liberalization process towards a
competitive industry structure and market-oriented regulation, both in electricity
transmission and electricity distribution.
In this chapter, we propose two methods of efficiency measures : parametric sto-
chastic frontier panel data model and non parametric data envelopment analysis.
2.2.1 Stochastic Frontier Models
Stochastic production frontiers were first developed by Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt [1977] and Meeusen and van den Broeck [1977]. This specification allows
for a non-negative random component in the error term to generate a measure of
technical inefficiency, or the ratio of actual to expected maximum output, given
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inputs and existing technology. The idea can be readily applied to panel data.
Indexing firms by i, the specification can be expressed formally by
Yit = f(Xit, β, t)e
vit−uit (2.1)
for time t, Yit output,Xit a vector of inputs and β a vector of parameters to be esti-
mated. As usual, the error term vit is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed as N(0, σ2v) and captures random variation in output due to factors
beyond the control of firms. The error term uit captures technical inefficiency in
production, assumed to be firm-specific, non-negative random variables, indepen-
dently distributed as non-negative truncations (at zero) of distribution N(µit, σ
2
u),
where, following Battese and Coelli [1995],
µit = δ0 + zitδ (2.2)
defines an inefficiency distribution parameter for zit a vector of firm-specific effects
that determine technical inefficiency and δ is a vector of parameters to be esti-
mated. Inputs variables may be included in both equations (1) and (2) as long as
technical inefficiency effects are stochastic, say for random variable ωit (see Bat-
tese and Coelli, 1995). The condition that uit ≥ 0 in equation (1) guarantees that
all observations lie on or beneath the stochastic production frontier. A trend can
also be included in equation (2) to capture time-variant effect. Following Battese
and Coelli [1992], variance terms are parametrized by replacing σ2v and σ
2
u with
σ2 = σ2v + σ
2
u and γ = σ
2
u/(σ
2
v + σ
2
u). For the basic case, the technical efficiency
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(TE) of the i-th firm in the i-th period can be defined as
TEit =
E(Yit | uit, Xit)
E(Yit | uit = 0, Xit)
= e−uit (2.3)
for E the usual expectations operator. The measure of technical efficiency is thus
based on the conditional expectation given by equation (3), given the values of
vit − uit evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the
model, where the expected maximum value of Yit is conditional on uit = 0. The
measure TEit clearly must have a value between 0 and 1. If γ = σ
2
u/(σ
2
v + σ
2
u) = 0
the expected value of Yit is 1 since there are no deviations due to technical efficiency
(σ2u = 0). If γ = 1 deviations in output are due entirely to technical inefficiency
effects. Thus, for 0 < γ < 1, output deviations are characterized by the presence
of both technical inefficiency and a random error.
2.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis
Inefficiency scores obtained from the stochastic production frontier can be com-
pared with those obtained using a linear programming approach. In this paper we
use a nonparametric method based on DEA to compute efficiency scores for Polish
distribution utilities. DEA is a linear programming method that uses data on the
input and output quantities to construct a linear surface over the data points. A
detailed description of the DEA approach to efficiency measurement may be found
in Charnes et al. [1994], or Cooper et al.[2000]. This frontier surface is construc-
ted by solving a sequence of linear programming problems, one for each company
(or DMU : Decision Making Unit) in a given sample. We use input-oriented CCR
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model that seeks to maximize an input-output ratio.2We assume that there are
n DMUs to be evaluated. Each DMU consumes varying amounts of m different
inputs to produce s different outputs. Specifically, DMUj consumes amount xij
of input i and produces amount yrj of output r. We assume that xij ≥ 0 and
yrj ≥ 0 and further assume that each DMU has at least one positive input and
one positive output value. The ratio of outputs to inputs is used to measure the
relative efficiency of the DMUj to DMU0 to be evaluated relative to the ratios
of all of the j = 1, 2, . . . , nDMUj . We can interpret the CCR construction as the
reduction of multiple-output / multiple-input situation (for each DMU) to that of
a single ”virtual”output and ”virtual” input. For a particular DMU the ratio of this
single virtual output to single virtual input provides a measure of efficiency that is
a function of the multipliers. We can express this ratio, which is to be maximized,
as the objective function for the particular DMU being evaluated as :
maxh0(u, v) =
∑
r uryr0∑
i vixi0
(2.4)
s.to
h0(u, v) =
∑
r uryrj∑
i vixij
≤ 1 (j = 1, . . . , n)
ur, vi ≥ for all i and r
2The Charnes, Cooper, Rhodes (CCR) DEA model (Charnes et al.[1978])
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It should be noted that the variables are the ur’s and the vi’s and the yr0’s and
xio’s are the observed output and input values, respectively, of DMU0, the DMU
to be evaluated. A set of normalizing constraints (one for each DMU) reflects the
condition that the virtual output to virtual input ratio of every DMU, must be
less than or equal to unity.
Since we have panel data, several possibilities arise within context of DEA. One
of them is to compute a frontier for each period and to compare these cross-
sectional runs. In this way, one constructs a frontier in each year and calculate the
efficiency of each firm relative to frontier in each period. Another possibility is to
treat the panel as a single cross-section (each firm in each period being considered
as an independent observation, pooling the observations altogether). Under this
approach, a single frontier is computed, and the relative efficiency of each firm in
each period is calculated by reference to this single frontier.
One case where DEA has featured in the regulated sector is that of OFWAT, the
regulator of English and Welsh water companies.3 DEA study was also proposed
by Berg et al. [2005] in order to asses the privatization effectiveness of Ukrainian
electricity distribution companies.
2.3 Model specification and Data
2.3.1 Frontier Analysis
Our data consists of a panel of 31 Poland’s distribution utilities over a 3-year
period from 2001 to 2003 (after eliminating 2. utilities for which data quality
3See Thanassoulis [2001].
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was insufficient) . The original data set is mainly based on the information from
Polish Power Transmission and Distribution Association. The ”Amadeus”executive
reports from Bureau van Dijk have been used to complete the data. The following
variables are going to be used in the estimation : electricity sales (in MWh), number
of employees (in vertical integrated firms we use only employees in the distribution
activity), total distribution lines (in kilometers), total transformer capacity (in
kVA), service area (in square kilometers) and number of customers in the service
area. The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. In all cases the sample size
is equal to 93 observations.
Tab. 2.1 – Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Electricity sales (in MWh) 2964695 1604648 101259 9396781
Number of employees 1327 671 137 2711
Distribution lines (in km) 21465 10377 8267 42226
Transformer capacity (in kV A) 2667 1298 795 6257
Service area (in km2) 9492 60612 486 27229
Number of customers 474058 22426 178000 1096900
In this paper we use a stochastic frontier model for panel data. This theoretical
framework has been subject of great body of literature.4 For the Poland’s electricity
distribution utilities we propose a Cobb-Douglas production function which can
be written as :
Yit = β0 +X1itβ1 +X2itβ2 +X3itβ3 + A1βA1 + A2βA2 + vit − uit (2.5)
4See Kumbhakar and Lovell [2000] and Greene [2002] for some recent developments. A sto-
chastic frontier panel data models applied for efficiency measures of electric distribution utilities
have been used in Farsi and Filippini [2003] and Estache and al. [2002]. However, no performance
studies of Polish electric distribution companies have been managed yet.
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where Y indicates the natural logarithm of electricity sales, X1 is the natural
logarithm of the number of permanent employees, X2 is the natural logarithm of
distribution network, X3 is the natural logarithm of transformer capacity, A1 is the
natural logarithm of the service area and A2 is the natural logarithm of customer
density. The technological efficiency is specified as time constant, which is rather
realistic regarding a relatively short time of analysis.
2.3.2 DEA Specification
For our DEA computations, the data source is the same as in the case of
the frontier analysis. Since we have panel data, we have chosen to calculate the
efficiency of each firm in each period. The result scores are the averages of yearly
scores. In our DEA runs, the input-output mix that had been used is presented in
table 2 :
Tab. 2.2 – DEA model
Inputs Outputs
Number of employees Electricity sales
Distribution network Number of customers
Transformer capacity
The choice of variables made here follows the general consensus found in the
current literature. 5 Although comparison of some alternative modeling could yield
additional insights, we believe that the choice of variables is rather convincing.
5For an exhaustive literature review see Estache et al. [2002].
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2.4 Estimation Results
This section presents and discusses the estimation results. The maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the stochastic frontier production model defined in equation (5)
were obtained using STATA. Table 3. presents the stochastic frontier estimates.
All the parameters are significant at the 5 per cent level indicating a good expla-
natory power of the variables included in the model. The coefficient on γ implies
that 98, 25% of the two components disturbance term is represented by technical
inefficiency effects. Since the coefficients of the production function do not have
any direct interpretation, we calculate the elasticities of output with respect to
each of the inputs. Transformer capacity is the input with the highest production
elasticity of about 0, 52 followed by distribution lines at 0, 40. Furthermore, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that labor elasticity equals 0. Surprisingly, esti-
mated coefficients of the environmental variables do not have the expected signs.
The consumers density has a negative effect on sales, which means that as the
number of consumers rises (ceteris paribus), energy delivered goes down. Service
area has also a negative sign, since given consumer density it is playing an input
role.
Finally, we have computed the efficiency scores for each utility, which are presented
in table 4. below. We were surprised by the efficiency scores’ interval which ranges
from 32 to 99%. If a firm has an efficiency index of 0.65 for instance (which is the
mean value in our study), it means that it could produce the same level of output
using 65% of its current inputs. For the regulatory purposes this means that the
price-cap should be based on 65% of current expenditures, not 100%. With this
approach, only the firms reaching 100 % of efficiency would be allowed to recover
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Tab. 2.3 – Stochastic production frontier estimation
Variable Estimate
Production function
Constant 13,27598
(0,001011)
Ln employees 0,0152997
(0,0023873)
Ln net 0,5444592
(0,0000136)
Ln capacity 1,224893
(0,0000014)
Ln area -0,4347432
(0,005636)
Ln customers -0,6882361
(0,002168)
γ 0,98255214
Average production elasticities
Employees 0,0776
Net 0,4041
Capacity 0,5276
Area -0,4146
Customers -0,9358
∗standard errors in the parentheses
their opportunity cost of capital while the others would have lower rates of return.
We have also computed the DEA efficiency scores using DEA Solver Pro 4.0 soft-
ware (see tab.6).
In this case, the efficiency scores’ interval ranges from 32% to 100% (which is
our reference level utility). These results differ, however, from our frontier mea-
sure. Clearly, we find two quite efficient firms under frontier approach performing
poorly within DEA specification. This problem is particularly serious when the
performance studies should serve as a decision making tool for the regulation au-
thority. In attempt to establish the conditions under which different efficiency me-
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Tab. 2.4 – Average technical efficiency scores by utility for the period 2001-2003
Utility Frontier Efficiency scores Rank
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Poznaniu 0,9027 3.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Bydgoszczy 0,8067 7.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Gorzowie Wlkp 0,4639 29.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Szczecinie 0,7720 10.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Zielonej Gorze 0,6651 13.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Jeleniej Gorze 0,5888 21.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Legnicy 0,9909 1.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Opolu 0,6426 16.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Walbrzychu 0,5282 25.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial we Wroclawiu 0,6612 15.
ENION SA oddzial Bielsko-Biala 0,5466 23.
ENION SA oddzial w Bedzinie 0,4786 27.
ENION SA oddzial w Czestochowie 0,7024 11.
ENION SA oddzial w Krakowie 0,6888 12.
ENION SA oddzial w Tarnowie 0,3773 30.
Gornoslaski Zaklad Energetyczny SA 0,5905 20.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Elblagu 0,6107 19.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Gdansku 0,6623 14.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Koszalinie 0,4714 28.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Olsztynie 0,6272 17.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Plocku 0,6271 18.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Toruniu 0,7790 9.
Lubelskie Zaklady Energetyczne ”LUBZEL” SA 0,8159 6.
Lodzki Zaklad Energetyczny SA 0,4873 26.
Rzeszowski Zaklad Energetyczny SA 0,5645 22.
STOEN SA 0,3295 31.
Zaklad Energetyczny Bialystok SA 0,8187 5.
Zaklad Energetyczny Lodz-Teren SA 0,7870 8.
Zaklad Energetyczny Warszawa-Teren SA 0,8916 4.
Zamojska Korporacja Energetyczna SA 0,5308 24.
Zaklady Energetyczne Okregu Radomsko-Kieleckiego SA 0,9228 2.
thodologies are most useful to regulatory authorities, Bauer et al.[1998] propose
a set of consistency conditions which, if met, would avoid the choice between ap-
proaches. The efficiency estimates derived from the different approaches should be
consistent in their efficiency levels, rankings, and identification of best and worst
firms, consistent over time. Specifically, Bauer’s consistency conditions are :
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Tab. 2.5 – Average technical efficiency scores by utility for the period 2001-2003
Utility DEA Efficiency scores Rank
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Poznaniu 0,9861 3.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Bydgoszczy 0,6424 7.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Gorzowie Wlkp 0,3437 29.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Szczecinie 0,5301 11.
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Zielonej Gorze 0,4752 15.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Jeleniej Gorze 0,4226 19.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Legnicy 0,9907 2.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Opolu 0,4716 16.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Walbrzychu 0,3990 22.
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial we Wroclawiu 0,4671 17.
ENION SA oddzial Bielsko-Biala 0,3883 23.
ENION SA oddzial w Bedzinie 0,3524 27.
ENION SA oddzial w Czestochowie 0,4873 13.
ENION SA oddzial w Krakowie 0,4929 12.
ENION SA oddzial w Tarnowie 0,3305 30.
Gornoslaski Zaklad Energetyczny SA 0,0,5522 9.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Elblagu 0,3763 24.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Gdansku 0,4771 14.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Koszalinie 0,3512 28.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Olsztynie 0,5413 10.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Plocku 0,4280 18.
ENERGA SA oddzial w Toruniu 0,5735 8.
Lubelskie Zaklady Energetyczne ”LUBZEL” SA 0,9409 5.
Lodzki Zaklad Energetyczny SA 0,3739 25.
Rzeszowski Zaklad Energetyczny SA 0,4107 20.
STOEN SA 0,3228 31.
Zaklad Energetyczny Bialystok SA 0,7251 6.
Zaklad Energetyczny Lodz-Teren SA 0,3555 26.
Zaklad Energetyczny Warszawa-Teren SA 0,9837 4.
Zamojska Korporacja Energetyczna SA 0,4012 21.
Zaklady Energetyczne Okregu Radomsko-Kieleckiego SA 1 1.
(i) the efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should have com-
parable means and other distributional properties ;
(ii) the different approaches should rank the firms in the approximately the same
order ;
(iii) all of the useful approaches should demonstrate reasonable stability over
time, i.e., consistently tend to identify the same firms as relatively efficient
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or inefficient in different years, rather than varying markedly from one year
to the next.
In order to check-up the quality of our estimates we have proceeded to evaluate
them under three Bauer’s conditions. Regarding the statistical properties of both
frontier and DEA approaches, the Wilcoxon test was carried out to contrast the
null hypothesis that both frontier and DEA distributions are the same. The re-
sult indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis at any level above 1,77%,
which indicates that the first consistency condition is not met. This result is not
particular to our study, but rather general in the applied literature, and it could
help in explaining why regulators tend not to translate efficiency measures into
expected cost reductions. If the levels of efficiency are not consistent across the
different methods of estimation, it is still possible that these methods generate
similar rankings of firms by their efficiency scores. Therefore, we proceeded to run
the Spearman’s ranking correlation test between pairs of scores. The correlation
between frontier-DEA sores is positive and significantly different from zero (the
null hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected). Table 6 reports efficiency scores
distribution and the results of test mentioned above. Regarding the third Bauer’s
Tab. 2.6 – Comparison of the distributions efficiency measures across methods
Approach Frontier DEA
Mean 0,6561 0,5361
Median 0,6494 0,4716
Deviation 0,1636 0,2204
Maximum 0,9901 1
Minimum 0,3295 0,3228
Sample 31 31
Test Statistics p-value Decision
Wilcoxon z -statistics= 2,371 0,0177 Reject H0
Spearman Spearman’s ρ= 0,6828 0,003 Reject H0
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condition, we do not include the econometric approaches because we have made a
hypothesis of technical efficiency being constant over time.
We insist on the fact that the efficiency scores are not consistent across utilities
within the same holding groups. It can be explained by a slack of management
convergence within a given group in a quite short time. One should remember
that the holding member groups were merged under regional, not size criterion.
Finally, in order to conclude our analysis, excepting two outlier firms, the efficiency
scores ranged in both upper and lower quartile classify the same best and worst
performing utilities.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that technical efficiency measures as a benchmar-
king method can be used for regulatory purposes. However, benchmarking should
be seen as signals rather than definitive indicators. The right choice of benchmark
can minimize the number of times that a misleading sign is sent to regulator.
Of course the results, as well as the methodologies can be contested by opera-
tors. But, as it was stressed by Estache et al.[2002] ”this is a normal situation, as
long as regulation is the game played between regulators and operators and as long
as this game is biased in favor of operators since they control much of the infor-
mation”. We are hoping that this study can be helpful for Poland’s ERA, which
can be inspired to use efficiency methods as a complementary regulation tool.
We regret that this study have been managed for 2001-2003 period only, but we
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could not risk any approximation for doubtful data. Unfortunately, detailed infor-
mation on distribution utilities companies is not available. This is the reason why
we could not proceed on cost frontier estimation, which has a bigger explanatory
power than production frontier method. This study, however, tries to reduce the
informational problem resulted from the EU enlargement in the way it fills-in a
part of the gap of rather underdeveloped academic and empirical studies regarding
Eastern European countries.6
In spite of the two different approaches used, our study is pretty consistent in the
way it establishes a clear rank of best and worst performers. For the regulators
it can be used as an additional instrument that reduces the information asymmetry.
2.6 Additional issue : Public service of electricity
For half a century governments have considered electricity as a public service.
They still do. In the European Union, Article 3.2 of the Electricity Directive, which
came into force 19 February 199, declares that
“Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electri-
city sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations
which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity,
quality and price of supplies and to environmental protection”.
In the United States, the activities of electricity companies are supervised by agen-
cies of state governments explicitly called Public Service Commissions or Public
6The necessity of managing empirical studies in the Eastern EU members countries was un-
derlined at the 6th SESSA conference ”Implementing the internal market of electricity : proposals
and time-tables”.
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Utility Commissions7. In most countries outside OECD, electricity remains expli-
citely a branch of government, either national, regional or local - a service the
government provides, with varying success, to the public under its jurisdiction.
As we know, in the 1990s, however, governments both inside and outside the OECD
have begun to liberalize their electricity systems. They may allow independent ge-
neration ; sell the electricity assets previously owned by government to private
investors (including foreign) ; establish a regulatory agency to some extent inde-
pendent of government ; require separate accounts for generation, transmission,
distribution and supply to users ; break up and restructure systems previously in-
tegrated, into separate bodies for generation, transmission, distribution and supply
to users ; and introduce competition between different generators and different sup-
pliers, possibly across national borders. In spite of all this upheaval governments
continue to regard electricity as a public service. In practice, however, liberaliza-
tion is drastically altering the policy levers by which government can direct the
public service dimension of electricity.
2.6.1 Electricity service : liberal and universal ?
If electricity is a public service, all of the public should feel equally entitled
to benefit from it. On a traditional monopoly system, the usual arrangement is a
pattern of invisible cross-subsidies, mandated directly or indirectly by government,
between categories of customer cheaper or more expensive to supply. In particular,
government may mandate provision of electricity to the poor, and to rural areas
where users are more widely dispersed and network connections therefore more
costly. The tariff may have a “postage-stamp” structure, in which all users of a
7In the “Le Robert & Collins” Dictionary “utility” means “public service”.
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given category, such as households, pay the same price per unit of electricity, no
matter where they are on the system or how much they cost to supply. Some go-
vernments subsidize the poor directly, by the “fuel supplements” that help them
to pay their electricity bills.
Liberalization, and in particular the introduction of competition, may jeopardize
such arrangements. In a market context, in which sellers of electricity compete to
win contracts with buyers who can choose between different sellers, some custo-
mers are more desirable than others. Customers who are cheap to supply, use a
lot of electricity at a fairly steady rate, and pay their bills promptly and thus are
the most attractive. They will find sellers eager to do their business and will be
offered the most advantageous terms. At the other end of scale of desirability are
thinly scattered customers in remote areas, and those in poor neighborhoods. In
a competitive market they have little bergaining power. As suppliers quickly pick
the most desirable customers, the least desired ones get pushed to the back of the
queue.
In a traditional electricity system, one corollary of the monopoly is the obligation of
supply. The government mandates the supplier to deliver all electricity required by
all users in his service area. When electricity is liberalized, this obligation becomes
hard to pin down and may vanish entirely. A network operator, whose activities
still constitute a monopoly, may be subject to government regulation that imposes
an obligation to connect all potential users in the service area to the network. The
cost of the connection, however, may fall on the user, especially in a remote area,
and may be substantial. Morover, a connection alone does not entitle a user to
take electricity from the network ; the user must also contract with supplier to buy
electricity and pay for it. If he does not pay, he may be disconnected.
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In the transition to full liberalization, so long as all the competing interests in-
volved are making enough money to keep them happy, these unresolved tensions
may remain below the surface. However, some companies in liberalized contexts
are already facing shareholder discontent, collapse of market value and takeovers.
Bankruptcy is no longer inconceivable. As competition intensifies, margins tighten
and profits shrink. Companies may become less willing to deliver services that do
not contribute adequately to accounts and balance sheets. The consequence wuold
be a growing challenge to governments that continue to view universal provision
of the benefits of electricity as an issue of social policy. Outside the OCDE, failure
of universal provision has long been the factor in political unrest. In EU countries,
where universal provision is now widely taken for granted, any weakening could
cause major trouble for governments.
2.7 Appendix
Tab. 2.7 – ”The BEST” and ”The WORST” Utilities
The Best Performers The Worst Performers
Zaklady Energetyczne Okregu Radomsko-Kieleckiego SA STOEN SA
ENERGIA PRO Koncern Energetyczny SA oddzial w Legnicy ENION SA oddzial w Tarnowie
ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Poznaniu ENEA SA Zaklad Glowny w Gorzowie Wlkp
Zaklad Energetyczny Warszawa-Teren SA ENION SA oddzial w Bedzinie
Lubelskie Zaklady Energetyczne ”LUBZEL SA” ENERGA SA oddzial w Koszalinie
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Chapitre 3
Why It Is So Hard ? A History of
Highway Concession Contracts in
Poland
3.1 Introduction
Among economists, there is a consensus concerning the need to improve infra-
structure, especially in the transport sector, which is seen as a necessary condition
for successful economic growth. However, in the case of a few, rather successful
transition countries, the problem of a poor transport infrastructure has not yet
been resolved. The best example is Poland, where the quality of its transport
infrastructure constitutes an important barrier to the country’s development, es-
pecially in the context of European integration. Although the total length of the
roads is relatively high, Poland lacks the minimum required standard of density
of highways and expressways. In order to overcome this unfortunate situation, the
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State authorities have decided to launch the “Infrastructure - A Key to Develop-
ment” program, formulating radical changes in the law as well as new methods of
financing infrastructure projects. The core concept of the government’s program
was to turn to the private sector to provide infrastructure improvements, basically
highways. One motivation was very limited tax resources, which led the State bor-
rowing as much as it could from development banks and private capital markets.
A second motivation was the hope that the private sector - motivated by profit -
would be more efficient than the State. The adopted solution was a Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) concept, in the form of long-term concession contracts.
In this chapter we investigate the reasons why highway construction projects
have been delayed. We argue that some aspects of this unfortunate situation could
have been avoided if the predictions of Transaction Cost (TCT), as well as In-
complete Contract (ICT) Theories had been taken into consideration. By taking
as an example the concession allocation for the first section of the A2 highway
(supposed to link the eastern and western parts of the country) we explain why
this project has partially failed. We enumerate some - in our opinion - blatant
errors by both public and private parties. We especially focus on the control issue,
as contract execution yielded flagrant deficiences. For each step of the A2 PPP
agreement we indicate at least one possible solution, as they became evident from
a theoretical point of view. To conclude, we propose a brief confrontation of the
lessons to be learned for the future, especially as the new government program for
land infrastructure has recently been published.1
1“Program Budowy Autostrad i Drog Ekspresowych w Latach 2006-2013” : national plan
for the construction of highways and expressways published by the Ministry of Infrastructure
January 19, 2006.
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3.2 The genesis of highway construction in Po-
land
In Europe, the very first highways were built in Germany and Italy between the
two World Wars. Those construction projects were undertaken to combat unem-
ployment, although in Germany the highway construction plans had a very pro-
nounced military flavor.In Poland, the first Polish Road Congress (Lvov, 1937)
proposed a highway network of 4000-6000 km (Despiney et al. [2000]). This pro-
position was amended two years later, establishing a plan for 4700 km of highways
with following priorities :
- Warsaw-Poznan-Poland’s western frontier,
- Gdynia-Bydgoszcz-Lodz-Katowice,
- Katowice-Cracow-Lvov,
- Warsaw-Lublin-Lvov-Poland’s eastern frontier,
- Pulawy-Sandomierz-Przemysl.
Unfortunately, this project was never realized because of the high construction
costs, an extremely low level of car ownership and - the most important factor-
the start of the 2nd World War. After the War, because of the frontier change
of about 250 km from East to West, Poland inherited 140 km of highways built
by the Germans. During the socialist era, there were only 117 km of highway-like
roads built, as well as 342 km of expressways. The relatively low level of cars to
the kilometer (in 1957 : 20 cars/km in Germany, 18 cars/km in France and only
3 cars/km in Poland) meant that the central planners paid much less attention to
the road infrastructure issue. In spite of the fact that Poland had signed some CO-
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MECON co-operation agreements concerning the development and modernization
of the Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin road linkage, the preparation for construction only
started in 1980, as the necessity of this axis became indispensable for the organi-
zation of the Olympic Games in Moscow. At that time, the project of the future
A2 highway was initiated and necessary land was bought by the State. However,
the construction process was frustrated until the mid nineties, when the increase
in lorry traffic became a serious problem.
3.3 Project schedule
Everybody who has ever been to Poland surely remembers its poor transporta-
tion network. In the early 90’s, numerous ideas for financing highway construction
were proposed. None of them, however, were applied. A short time later, the Po-
lish government proposed the “National Plan for Highway Construction” based
upon a PPP method. The government was encouraged by the World Bank’s “pri-
vate participation in infrastructure” policy. Indeed, by 1996, the project draft had
been prepared. The program was launched in early 1997 within the first successful
concession auction biding. In 2001, public opinion was shocked by the Supreme
Chamber of Control report revealing that in 1998-2000 0 km of highways were
built in the four PPP concession schemes.2 After a stormy period in Parliament
and media, followed by some ministers’ dismissal, no reconstruction project emer-
ged. Therefore, one may ask, how could this happen ?
2Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli (NIK) - supreme state audit body. Its status is regulated by the
Constitution of April 1997 and by the NIK Act of 23 December 1994.
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3.4 The attribution problem
3.4.1 The story
Under the Polish law on toll highways3 the building and exploitation of an
highway requires a limited three-step auction process, which leads to the objective
selection of the best concessionaire. The winning company for the A2 highway
was “Autostrada Wielkopolska SA”4. Following the winning tender, the Conces-
sion Agreement was signed. As the concessionaire, “Autostrada Wielkopolska SA”
was initially bound to build and operate the first section of the A2 Highway from
Swiecko to Konin (the first segment of 148,7 km2). Furthermore,“AutostradaWiel-
kopolska SA” did not become the owner of the A2 ; it ensured the performance of
the Concession Agreement for the term of 40 years, that is by 2037. The land
on which the highway is built remains the property of the State Treasury and the
Company pays an annual rent to the State. The party to the Concession Agreement
on behalf of the Polish government is the Minister of Infrastructure, while the body
responsible for its implementation is the Highway Construction and Exploitation
Agency. In order to meet its obligation under the Concession Agreement, a De-
velopment Company was established - “A2 Bau Development GmbH”(founded by
the shareholders of “AWSA” : “Strabag AG” and “NCC international AB”) which
is responsible for the construction, and the operating company - “Autostrada Eks-
ploatacja SA”(founded by the shareholders of “AWSA” : “Transroute International
31994 Toll Highways Act. The Act provides a legal framework for the construction of highways
(procedures for location of the highways, acquisition of property on which the highways are to
be built, tender proceedings, concessions for the construction and operation of highways). The
Act also regulates financial issues related to the construction of highways.
4“Autostrada Wielkopolska SA”, the first Polish special purpose entity incorporated in 1993
was founded in 1994 with the goal of financing, building and operating the A2 Toll Highway. Its
capital is made up with Polish and foreign shareholders’ funds.
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SA”, “Kulczyk Holding SA” and “Strabag AG”). In order to ensure proper perfor-
mance under the contracts, in strict compliance with Polish law and the provisions
of the Project Agreements, the parties to the concession : the Minister of Infrastruc-
ture and the Concessionaire, appointed an Independent Engineer - “WS Atkins”
from the UK, whose duty was to supervise the design process, the construction
and operation of the highway, as well as to oversee for the proper execution and
adequate quality of the work. Though on first sight the contractual clauses seemed
to be clear and sound, their interpretation and implementation were baﬄing.
3.4.2 What went wrong ?
As we have already mentioned, once the Concession agreement was signed, a
three-year period of astonishing inactivity in the construction process took place.
After analyzing the Concession contract, some issues remain, at least, doubtful.
Therefore, it seems clear that :
– The Concessionaire did not fulfill the definitive “commencement deadline
for the first segment ”, stipulated in the Concession contract for March 10,
1999. This situation resulted from the lack of financial closure for the pro-
ject. Indeed, some contract clauses were too lax, especially those concerning
the issue of risk distribution between the Concessionaire and the State. Par-
ticularly, there were no clauses making clear the State’s guarantees given
84
to the Concessionaire for credit with investment banks 5. As a result, the
Concessionaire was not able to finalize his financial project.
– The other side of the same coin reveals that the auction jury members (the
State Agency) were (at least should be) in perfect possession of information
on the financial situation of the bidders, as required for the tender. Besides
some restrictions on shareholders’ equity, there were some other legal obli-
gations such as minimum fund gathering by the Concessionaire 6. Therefore,
two possibilities emerge : either the jury members were incompetent, or the
contracting offer was incomplete.
3.4.3 What are the theoretical suggestions ?
When we look at the theory, some crucial questions must be clarified. Logically,
one may ask whether a “perfect auction” exists. Surely, the trivial response is “no”,
but that does not explain some procedural errors. As highlighted by Williamson
5The Concessionaire was perfectly sure that (taking into consideration its equity weakness)
he would not be able to build without the State’s guarantees for credits. This is the best example
of the Concessionaire’s opportunism which is seen in his public statement stressing that
“...based on the analysis of the toll revenues generated so far showing slight excess
over the assumed levels, it may be said that there is no risk that the State Treasury
guarantee will be exercised”.
6At the level of 100% coverage of the first segment. The final Financial Plan for the first
section was settled down in 2000 ( !) and annexed to the initial Concession Agreement. The
lump sum contract price for the investment was agreed at EUR 875 million (EUR 637.5 milion
excluding indirect costs). The funds required to meet the foregoing costs came from three major
sources :
i equity coming from the Concessionaire’s shareholders accounting for more than 27% of the
total development cost ;
ii loans in the form of the bond issue and supplier credit ;
iii Senior Loan ;
iv the loan from the European Investment Bank (never granted).
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[1976], the effectiveness of franchise bidding firstly depends on the ability of the
franchisor to characterize the service he wants to put to tender. Yvrande-Billon
[2005] explains that an adequate service specification is important in franchising,
first as a basis for competition in the bidding process and, secondly, to set the
benchmarks for evaluating bids. Therefore, it is important for the franchisor to
refine his call for tender as much as possible. If he fails, the costs of bidding may
increase and applicants may not be interested in the auction, discouraged by the
high uncertainty of the project. Furthermore, as mentioned in Bajari et al.[2003],
a vague description of the subject matter of auction may lead to adverse selection
and end by selection of the most opportunistic candidate. If the call for tender is
incomplete and investment is complex, the auction process may result in choosing
the bidder who can exploit the contractual blanks and thus may make the most
of the fact that the contract in question is likely to fail. A potential danger of this
situation consists in the opportunistic anticipation of a renegotiation of contract
by the auction winner, who may benefit from the financial compensation stipulated
in avoidance clauses.
Another problem with the auction process is intrinsic to the nature of concession
agreements. For instance Posner [1972] stresses that
“[p.113]...the concession method deprives the franchise system of one
of its most attractive features, ease of administration, since when the
franchise is awarded to the higher bidder the process of choosing among
applicants involves a minimum of administrative machinery and official
discretion”.
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Indeed, the simplicity of the auction process could be preserved only if the conces-
sion concerned less complex investment. In the case of infrastructure concessions,
one should remember that a highway concession in the PPP scheme typically co-
vers the financing, building and operating of a road. Thus, is there a tenable means
of anticipating for all factors ? And, similarly, is there a solution for internalizing
the plurality of states of nature that might occur ?
With respect to the transaction cost economics framework, in the case of an un-
doubtedly incomplete long term contract, the extreme importance of the ex ante
stage, that is the auction process, become obvious. It follows that in the ex ante
stage it should be anticipated by the franchisor that contract renegotiation will in-
evitably occur. Summarizing, it appears that the contract incompleteness should
be taken into consideration at the very beginning of the project.
On the other hand, one could imagine how difficult it is to decide ex ante what
has to be done ex post. We fully agree with Crocker and Masten [1996] who argue
that, as the transaction becomes more complex or uncertain, contracts are likely
to become more
“...’rational’ in character. Rather than attempting to lay out a detailed
specification of the terms of the agreement, relational contracts attempt
simply to establish the process through which future terms of trade will
be determined7, or, to establish, in effect, a constitution governing the
ongoing relationships”(Goldberg [1976], p.428).
In Figure 1, we have depicted an example of the “optimal” long-term contract. It
is shown that the most adapted contract anticipates for contingencies not covered
by the agreement and the manner of resolving them.
7p.9
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Fig. 3.1 – Long-term contract
Long-term
contract
Ex-post
opportunism
Contractual
incompletness Resolutive clauses 
Some remarks have to be made concerning the State guarantees for credit by
the Concessionaire. Because of the high risk associated with highway franchises,
lenders (investment banks) have refused to grant loans to the Concessionaire un-
less the government guarantees the debt. Engel et al.[2001] qualify this situation as
an usual pitfall for the State. Firstly, guarantees reduce the incentives for lenders
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to screen projects and monitor their performance. A second danger concerns the
overestimation of demand such that the Concessionaire could not face significant
losses if traffic turns out to be below expectations, that is to say, the whole invest-
ment might become a “white elephant”. In addition we argue that bailing out the
Concessionaire stands against the idea of PPP, where the State is rather looking
to be free of financial commitment, as its Treasury cannot afford the investment
alone. Therefore, we are pointing out that the liability of the State8 in the case of
the investment fiasco is excessive.
3.4.4 What should have been done ?
We are trying here to enumerate some propositions in order to avoid an im-
passe situation in the future. We do not claim a “miracle” solution. Nevertheless,
it seems that the call for tender needs to be more explicit in that the financing
structure and risk sharing ought to be specified9. In our opinion, the weakness
of Polish equities constituted a sufficient incentive to broaden the call for tender.
A strong start-up capital mixed with the know-how of foreign investors (capital
groups) would have accelerated the construction. But, paradoxically, foreign inves-
tors could not have felt attracted by the blanks in the project and the low chances
of taking money out. Therefore, a preliminary independent financial audit should
always be welcomed. Finally, the presence of clear and precise avoidance or retrac-
tion (annulation) clauses not only smoothes bilateral relations but also creates an
atmosphere of trust.
8By “the liability”we mean all legal responsibilities of the State excepting the statutory ones,
such as being the the party to the Concession agreement or the land owner.
9This can be done by simulating a least-present-value-of-revenue (LPVR) auction. For details
see Engel et al.[2002]
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3.5 The supervision problem
3.5.1 The story
The Ministry of Infrastructure entrusted the supervision of highway construc-
tion to The Highways Construction and Exploitation Agency (HCEA). This is a
common example of delegation of authority, as The Head of Agency accomplishes
public management and supervision tasks on behalf of the Government. We notify
that The Head of Agency is directly subordinate to his administrative superior,
and thus, supposed to execute his decisions. In the case of the A2 Concession,
however, the coordination between those two institutions was not as smooth and
efficient as it should have been.
As we remember from the previous section, the construction of the first segment
of the A2 did not start because of the lack of financial closure. In order to avoid
this unfortunate situation in the future, the Concession Agreement was annexed,
providing a new deadline for financial closure. Furthermore, there were some new
clauses setting forth the possibility of cancellation once the deadline was passed.
The new deadline was scheduled for the end of July, and, unfortunately, was also
missed. In this case, the Concession Agreement should have been cancelled by the
State. But it did not happen. In spite of the Ministry of Infrastructure’s wish to
cancel, the Director of HCEA promoted his own vision of problem resolution, wan-
ting to spread the Concession Agreement over a new consortium. This free-rider
behavior was tolerated by The Minister of Infrastructure, who surely knew that -
from the legal point of view - a kind of substitution of the Concession part was
not possible (a new auction would have been required). Furthermore, the incorpo-
ration idea was a disaster, as the Concessionaire (AW SA) would never agree to
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integrate with another firm, as it was not interested in sharing profits. It is also
important to mention that the contract renegotiation feasibility studies ordered by
the HCEA cannot be considered as objective, since the audit provider company
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers) was formerly hired by the AW SA as a consultant body
to negotiate the initial Concession Agrement.
3.5.2 What are the theoretical suggestions ?
In the face of the story above, one can imagine that the public agency is a
haven for inefficiency. However, this is a very simplistic view of reality. Generally,
the “bureaucratic”inefficiencies (as we think they should be called) result from the
lack of coordination in the decision-making process. In the TCT, the governance
structure mainly depends on the asset specificity (nature of investment), degree
of uncertainty and type of transaction (and its frequency)10. Therefore, in our
case, “internalization” of Concession management and its follow-up in the form of
hierarchy was appropriate. The problems rather come from misunderstanding of
the authority-hierarchy relation. It should be remembered that
“ we can talk about hierarchical relations between the subsets of par-
ticipants A and B when the subset B refers to the subset A’s goals
rather than to its own in decision-making process and subordinates to
A’s decision in the case of conflict”. (Guillaume [1972])
When we turn to analyze the situation between the public agency (The High-
ways Construction and Exploitation Agency) and its superior (The Ministry of
Infrastructure) we can ascertain the lack of acceptance and validation of hierarchy
10For an exhaustive review of organizational theory see Me´nard [1996].
91
by the public agency. There were two reasons for non-execution of the superior’s
decision : firstly, the conflict of goals, and secondly, the acquiescence to insubordi-
nation. The latter results from the absence of a control mechanism. Furthermore,
the control procedures undertaken by the superior and thus aimed at the subordi-
nates are necessary for the execution of the decisions. It follows that the inefficiency
of the State in the Concession-managing process was a direct consequence of the
“weak” coercive mechanism. It is important to add that an efficient control proce-
dure depends on an adequate span of control11. As we have already mentioned, the
superior’s decisions were ignored by the intermediary link in the hierarchical chain,
namely the Minister’s Secretary General. In spite of the fact that the hierarchical
structure was simple, and thus the span of control limited (only one intermediary
level), serious inefficiencies resulted.
The lack of control regarding the final subordinate - the Concessionaire (and
the party of agreement at the same time !) had also contributed to the invest-
ment fiasco. By adapting the initial Calvo-Wellisz [1978] model to the grantor-
concessionaire relation, we will show the extreme importance of supervision.
Primarily, we assume that the concessionaire’s utility index (U) depends on its
future profit12 (Π), and effort (e) :
U = u(Π)− v(e), (3.1)
Π ≥ 0, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1,
11The span of control (SOC) is a simple managerial construct which identifies or regulates the
amount of direct supervision that exists between a superior and his direct subordinates within
an organization. For further readings see Yassine [2005]
12We assume that this is the present value of future tool incomes, and may be approximately
given as LPVR.
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and u′ ≥ 0, v′ ≥ 0, u′′ ≤ 0, v′′ ≥ 0. If e = 1, the concessionaire is fully effective ;
if e = 0, he is completely idle. The presence of a monitoring system implies that
the supervision of the concessionaire’s effort (i.e. progress of investment) is less
costly than the direct measurement of his marginal product. Furthermore, effec-
tive supervision requires the imposition of penalties for substandard work. Let P
be the probability of the concessionaire task being checked by his superior (i.e.
The Highways Construction and Exploitation Agency). If the concessionaire is not
checked, he is presumed to have made the maximum effort (e = 1) and he is given
a credit guarantee g (measured in units of future discounted toll revenue). On the
other hand, if the concessionaire’s real performance is checked, his level of effort
e is revealed and he gets only a part of credit guarantee eg, involving a penalty
equal to (1− e)g. Assuming profit equals guarantee of credit attribution, expected
utility, γ, associated with selecting a level of effort equal to e is given by :
γ = P [u(eg)− v(e)] + (1− P )[u(g)− v(e)] (3.2)
In his turn, the concessionaire chooses e in order to maximize his welfare and
defines
Γ(P, g) = max
0≤e≤1
γ (3.3)
For simplicity, we also assume that there exists a unique e associated with (3) and
denote it
e = E(P, g) (3.4)
Thus, it is easy to see that
∂E
∂P
≥ 0 (3.5)
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and
∂E
∂g
≥ 0 ∪
∂E
∂g
< 0 (3.6)
Proposition 1 The implementation of a supervision scheme increases the level of
effort of the supervisee. At the same time, one cannot be sure whether application
of penalties in the case of substandard work has a negative or positive impact on the
supervisee’s performance. It is important to say that the very awareness of being
checked works as an incentive mechanism, as each and every supervisee prefers not
to be checked. It follows that for a supervisor, providing a spontaneous and random
check seems to be the optimal solution.
Proof 1 (Immediate)
For any function E(∆), we know that e ≥ 0, P > 0 and g ≥ 0. In order to define
the sign of partial derivatives of E(∆), we simply apply their definition formulas.
E ′P (P0, g0) =
∂E
∂P
(P0, g0) = lim
P→P0
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(P, g0)−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(P0, g0)
P − P0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
E ′g(P0, g0) =
∂E
∂g
(P0, g0) = lim
g→g0
E(P0, g)− E(P0, g0)
g − g0︸ ︷︷ ︸
sign undetermined

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3.5.3 What should have been done ?
From now on it is clear, that the Concession agreement should have been uni-
laterally and immediately cancelled at the second financial closure deadline.
The Infrastructure Ministry should have ordered its cancellation by his su-
bordinate (i.e. Chief of The Highways Construction and Exploitation Agency).
Tolerating the Concessionaire’s inactivity brought about by two consecutive finan-
cial closures led to a contract renegotiation procedure (the renegotiation clauses
added to the concession agreement constitute a brand new text, totally cancel-
ling the initial one, so it is really difficult to call it a “rider”). Furthermore, the
renegotiation process placed the State in a suppliant position. Finally, once the
renegotiation had occurred, the State party should not have agreed to make the
new text confidential, firstly, because the investment involved public expenditure
and secondly, because the confidentiality excluded an independent audit.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have emphasized the most striking problems which affec-
ted the very early stages of a highway construction program in Poland. The PPP
concept failed to become successful because of the errors committed during the
auction process. In the case of the A2 highway concession, it seems that the pre-
qualification step was skimped, making impossible to shortlist bidders with the
required financial means and expertise. A way to avoid this kind of situation in
the future is to strengthen the domestic capital market. Strong domestic finance
is preferable, all else being equal, because it raises fewer political sensitivities and
avoids the complications of exchange rate risks. At the other extreme, it appears
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that more consideration should be given to the use of concession contracts that
are shorter and simpler, so that they have a greater chance of being complete. It is
also clear that the management of concession agreements should be simplified and
monitoring schemes ought to be implemented in order to prevent a contractor’s
opportunistic and/or free-rider behavior. Finally, the State should be extremely
careful while delegating authority : as we have seen, softening of subordination in
the hierarchical chain may lead to bureaucratical pitfalls, depriving it from one of
its more desirable features, such as ease of administration instead.
It is important to mention that the A2 highway construction is continuing, in
spite of the renegotiation process, and one may expect that it will be possible to
reach the German border by 2008. It seems that the government has learned its
lesson and is keen to engage more budgetary sources in infrastructure projects. It
has very strong monetary incentives to do so, as Poland will receive substantial
aid from EU funds (the EU budget for 2007-2013 projects EUR 91 bn for Poland,
roughly EUR 20 bn of which will be spent on road and highway construction).
Nevertheless, extreme vigilance is required concerning its spending. The Ministry
of Infrastructure’s recent statement informs us that the “government’s ambition”
is to use all resources assigned for road construction, as in 2005 Poland had used
only 63% of all funds available for this purpose. Finally, the recent experiments
with a new financing system called “Special Purpose Issue” need to be watched, as
the bureaucratic machinery is not very keen on recognizing its own errors.
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3.7 Appendix A
3.7.1 Trans-European Networks
As stressed by the European Commission, transport infrastructure plays a key
role in growth and regional convergence. This challenge is being faced at regional,
local and European level, in the framework of the common transport policy and
the trans-European transport network. In this respect, in April 2004, the European
Parliament and Council identified 30 priority projects that represent an investment
of EUR 225 billion by 2020. In July 2005, the Commission defined the political
and technical coordination procedures for achieving the TEN-T, including the
appointment of six European co-ordinators and the creation of an executive agency.
From a regional policy point of view, this should play a major role in developing
quality transport during the 2007-2013 period in accordance with the priority
objectives proposed by the Commission, i.e. convergence, regional competitiveness
and employment and territorial co-operation. Facing two recent enlargements, the
European Commission has decided to target the North-South axis for the TEN-
T project. Thus, the fast growing and anticipated west and eastbound exchange
traffic seems to be underestimated.
In Poland the impression was that the New European Space of the 21st century
would probably create a renaissance of the grand East - West or West - East
trajectory, which had been destroyed by the Iron Curtain in the second half of
the 20th century (Kuklinski [2002]). For Polish economists it was not excluded,
that by the middle of the 21st century - the West - Eastern rajectory would be
more important than the North -South - Eastern one. Certainly, the Belarus -
Poland corridor is the most important for transit flows between Russia and the EU
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(especially for eastbound transports) (Laurila [2001]). The large-scale European
Investment Program started with the construction of the French TGV-East at
the beginning of 2002. This project was considered by Poles as a confirmation
of priority given to the West-East axis. The Great East Project was elaborated
in 1994 by DATAR in the context of future Eastern enlargement of the EU. For
the Central and Eastern Europe the TGV-project is very important. At regional
level the hub of development will be created around the TGV stations (the struggle
between Nancy, Metz and Strasbourg for the TGV trajectory is highly instructive).
3.8 Appendix B
Fig. 3.2 – A2 Investment Appraisal
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3.9 Appendix C
Fig. 3.3 – Financial flows in Concession agrement
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Chapitre 4
The Demand for Private Health
Care in Poland
4.1 Introduction
H
ealth is a public service almost by definition, though private insurance is
expected to play a greater financing role. Finding the right balance between
public and private health coverage and building the appropriate regulatory frame-
work is an ongoing policy challenge. The background in all Central and Eastern
European countries is similar - a rapidly deteriorating, underfunded, undermana-
ged and depersonalized health system struggling with rapidly increasing demand
for services, hospital beds, physicians and other healthcare professionals. With this
in mind, and with the emergence of a fast-growing middle class and an increase in
personal and disposable income, the rapid growth of private supplementary health
coverage is just a matter of time. Several transition countries are experimenting
new solutions in order to satisfy health care needs of their citizens. They are trying
102
to settle down a mix of public/private medical services. However, reforming health
system is not an easy affair, so a preliminary study of demand for private health
is highly desirable.
In this chapter we look at the demand for public and private healtcare in
Poland, as representative of a transition economy, one that under Socialist regime
of the latter half of the 20th century was limited to just public healthcare by the
government. Our idea is to focus on the demand on the ability for the public health
care system to maintain its quality. Within such a study we therefore contribute
to the debate on whether a strong private market for healthcare can co-exist with
the traditional public health services in transitional economies.
Free and general access to health services, guaranteed since the constitution
of 1952, has long been considered the foundation of Polish health system. Ac-
cordingly, the national budget of the government has historically been the main
source of health financing. Total health expenditure in Poland, public and private,
is reported to be between 5-6% of GDP which is quite similar to that of several
other Est-European countries. It means that public spending on health care, as a
percentage of GDP is rather similar to Romania or Bulgaria, who spend around
6% of GDP (non-member states of OECD), and is lower compared to West Eu-
ropean countries like France, Germany and Sweden, where expenditure on health
care has averaged between 8% to 11% of GDP1. Although 72% of funding comes
from the public purse, the use of private health care services is rising. Increasing
use of private health care in Poland is mainly generated by two factors : a general
enrichment of population and rapidly growing “waiting lists” for specialistic care.
1Source :“Projecting OECD health and long-term expenditures : What are the main drivers ?”,
Economics Department Working Paper 477, 2005
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In addition, more and more companies are offering the private health insurance
plans for their employees. Since mid-nineties, there has been a rapid growth of
private health centers (middle-size towns, cities) and private hospitals and clinics
(big cities).
This growth affects public provision in a number of ways. First, as the private
sector operates alongside a public sector, this reduces the availability of free care,
as long as labor in the national health care is also employed in the private sec-
tor, predominantly simultaneously. In the short run, a rapid expansion in private
demand would reduce the availability of medical staff to the public sector and so
reduce the quality of national health services. Propper [2000] underlines that an
increase in the use of private services may be accompanied by a decrease in the
support for, and willingness to pay, taxes for the public sector services. Second,
since Poland’s accession to the European Union and the possibility for Polish me-
dical profession to work legally abroad, high wages have already attracted 4.3%
of physicians registered in Poland (October 2006)2. Migration issue concerns es-
pecially extremely high skilled specialists, so in the big cities public specialistic
emergency services become unavailable. In consequence, urgent specialistic help
may only be found in private hospitals and clinics. That is why people become
more and more eager to pay for additional medical insurance, which is seen as a
guarantee of immediate and good quality medical help.
Growing demand for private health care affects the public provision in a way
that it strengthens competition for medical services. The notion that private com-
petition is a good idea rests on two key notions (Stockman [1981], Keane [2004]) :
2Source : Polish Chamber of Physicians
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(i) Choice is good. Public insurance is “one size fits all”, while private firms can
provide plans better tailored to individual preferences. (ii) Competition among
alternative plans will promote market efficiency, because plans will have to keep
expenses down to survive in a competitive market place.
Although there has recently been a significant increase in the number of evalua-
tive studies on public/private health provision, scarce empirical evidence exists on
health care markets in transition countries. This is mainly because of the lack of
systematic survey data on not only health care preferences, but more generally
on living conditions of population in these countries. However, extremely reach
literature on the link between public and private health sectors in the US and UK
has been of great interest in terms of economic policies and individual choice and
use of health care services.
Although some analysis have identified the importance of income in the use
of private health services (Papadakis et al.[1987], Calnan et al.[1993], Propper
[1989,1993]), this literature has not been able to establish whether the distinct
economic and social profile of private sector users is simply due to individual fixed
effects or whether changes in income or attitudes would increase private sector
use. Propper [2000] was the first to investigate these issues and to examine the
dynamics of private sector use (whether use is related to past demand, or whether
current demand for one private service is accompanied by private demand for
another). Economic efficiency of mixed public/private health insurance has also
been treated (Besley [1989], Selden [1993], Blomqvist et al. [1997]), dealing with
such issues as equity, adverse selection and administration of health care. Blomqvist
[1997] results show that a mixed system in which consumers are allowed to have
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supplementary private insurance in addition to a government plan is less efficient
than the equilibrium in a purely private competitive market and it is also less
efficient than an optimally designed governmental plan. Recent economic literature
rises also a question of quality of medical services and its impact on the demand
for private health care. For instance Hanson et al.[2004] use household data from
Cyprus to estimate the effect of quality on patient’s choice between public and
private outpatient care. They find that patients’ choice of provider is sensitive to
quality, and that interpersonal quality (amount of time spent by the doctor with
the patient, the courtesy and helpfulness of the doctor), and that interpersonal
quality is more important than either technical quality or system-related factors.
An interesting finding comes from Hoel and Saether [2003] paper. Investigation on
waiting time for public health care came up with an astonishing ascertainment that
patients choosing public care may be better off with waiting time than without.
The reason is that waiting time induces patients with high waiting costs to choose
private treatment, thus reducing the cost of public health care that everyone pays
for. Finally, the work of Long et al.[2005] shows that having a supplementary health
coverage in the US improves access to care, but only for low-income beneficiaries.
In addition, Finkelstein [2004] finds that US Medicare coverage does not have
substantial effects on coverage in residual private insurance markets.
In our study we focus on the dynamics of private sector use. Following Propper
[2000] we estimate a model of health care services which takes into account the
choice a potential user of care in Poland has among the private sector and the
NHF (National Health Fund). It examines not only hospital and physician use
but also the use of dental and other services based in community. The estimated
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model allows past use to affect the present use of health services. The data set used
is “Social diagnosis : objective and subjective quality of life in Poland” provided
by Polish Council for Social Monitoring. This data set contains extremely rich
and detailed information on living conditions of households (income, nutrition,
housing conditions, education, health care) as well as the individual impressions
on quality of life in Poland. Health care is the most extensive part of this data
set, pertaining to households. It permits to determine how often the household
members took advantage of health care services, in what form and in which health
care units, who pays for medical treatment, what are the reasons for selection of
specific health care units, what health care needs are unfulfilled due to financial
reasons, how much money (excluding the health insurance premium) was spent
by households from their own budgets on various expenses associated with health
care within the previous 3 months, how the households assess their access to health
care and how well they are informed of the rules of functioning of the health care
system.
We start with a short description of financing health care in Poland. then
economic model of demand for private health care is detailed and econometrically
tested in section 3. Two following sections analyze the results. Finally, the last
section concludes.
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4.2 Financing health system and private health
care in Poland
The national budget has historically been the main source of health care fi-
nancing. The Ministry of Finance funded the health care system from the central
budget, although other sources of financing began to be more significant after 1990.
The government proportion of total health care funding has dropped throughout
the 1990s as private sources have risen.
Since 1950s, the Polish State had provided universal access to health services.
Health sector reforms in the 1990s have sought to maintain this commitment. The
1991 “Health Care Institutions Act” and subsequent regulations set out a range of
basic therapy and cosmetic surgery. It also excluded some services in health resorts
(spas), but those who are entitled to health care can still obtain free dental care
and balneotherapy at these spas.
The 1997 “General Health Insurance Act”, introduced in January 1999, chan-
ged the system of financing. Funds then came from two main sources. First, the
insurance funds financed the direct costs of health services to patients through
contracts with service providers. Second, government budgets (state, voivodships
or gminas) continued to finance public health services, the hospital costs of all
health services, and specialist tertiary care services (such as organ transplants)
and very expensive drugs (such as immunosuppressive drugs).
In the reformed health care system, the involvement of the state budget and self-
government budgets in health care financing is very limited. Now expenditures
from those budgets play only elementary role. In general, the public health targets
health insurance premiums for specific groups of the population (the unemployed
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receiving social security benefits, persons receiving social pensions, farmers, war
veterans and others), and investments in public health care institutions are finan-
ced from those budgets. The major part of funds allocated for the implementation
of health programmes is transferred to the National Health Fund. Funds from
the state budget are used to cover the costs of health services provided in life
threatening situations, in case of accidents to childbirth to persons who are not
insured and thus do not pay health insurance premiums. The Minister of Health
may give the consent for covering the costs of treatment or diagnostic procedures
not available in the country to be performed abroad. The list of highly specialized
procedures, financed from the budget of the Ministry of Health on the basis of
contracts signed with service providers, has been cut down. The responsibility for
contracting numerous procedures, formerly placed on that list, has been taken over
by the National Health Fund and its branches.
In sum, a sick person can consult a general practitioner or a specialist in an
outpatient clinic, receive hospital treatment and dental treatment, use ambulance
and medical transport services. Patients need a referral if they want to receive
hospital treatment or see a specialist, except for gynecologists, dermatologists,
venereologists, oncologists, ophthalmologists, psychiatrists and dental surgeons. In
the event of a sudden illness or accident, the patient can call for an ambulance or
go directly to a hospital emergency room.
However, the public health service is contending with the shortage of funds.
In spite of some health service establishments with ultramodern equipment, Po-
land has poorly equipped clinics filled with poor retirees waiting in long lines to
see a doctor. As a result, patients who have money and do not want to wait for
treatment increasingly choose subscription medical services or private healthcare
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services, despite the fact that by doing so the patients cannot use the contribution
they obligatory pay for health insurance because private health funds are still non-
existent in Poland. Following in the footsteps of large multinational corporations,
there are about 20 medical companies which offer medical services for a regular
monthly fee appeared on the Polish market in the last decade. These include : Me-
dicover, Damian Medical Center, Enel-Med Medical Center, Medycyna Rodzinna
and Falck Medycyna Sp. z o.o.
The problem of Polish health care is predominantly the lack of funds which
collides with societal expectation shaped by almost 50 years of communism, where
a well staffed and free health service was one of the few tangible benefits of a
system that otherwise produced economic chaos. Following Poland’s entry into
EU in 2004, Poles began to compare themselves to their neighbors in the West,
and began to demand similar level of health care to Germany and France. Doctors
also began to demand higher wages.
Since early nineties, subsequent governments have attempted to fix the system
and make it more efficient, often producing even more confusion and disarray in the
process. Government instability has not helped. Between 2001 and 2005, Poland
had five health ministers.
In the 1990s, there was a move toward decentralization, with the creation of
regional funds responsible for health spending. In 2002, the system was overturned
and centralized, creating a National Health Fund (NHF) responsible for about 80%
of public spending on health.
Although the NHF had been the brainchild of ex-communist left, Poland’s new
centre-right government promised that there would be no more health care revo-
lutions, and that constant efforts would be made to improve the existing system.
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Current Minister of Health is trying to deal with those complex problems at
once. In addition to the salary increase, health-care spending overall is increasing
by 5 billion zlotys next year to 41 billion, a difficult feat at a time when the
government has promised that the deficit will not exceed 30 billion zlotys and the
European Commission is criticizing the government’s budget. Health-insurance
contributions are also being increased from 8.75% to 9% of wages.
Minister’s plan is to present a“basket”of heath services to parliament this year,
spelling out exactly what will be covered by the government. ”The essence of the
basket is to tell society that not everything is free” says the Minister.
4.3 The demand for private health
4.3.1 The economic model
In this paper we follow Propper [2000] model of demand where public and
private care coexist. We use this framework to explore the impact of income, price
and quality of the public alternative, and past use on the current demand for
private health care. This model follows also Goddard et al. [1994] in allowing
individuals to have three discrete choices (to use private care, to use public care
and no medical care). These choices will be in turn affected by the costs and the
quality of public care, and the costs and quality of private care.
For any individual, indexed by i, let Vi be the benefit of private health care and
pi be the cost relative to income). For simplicity, we assume that the clinical
benefits of private care are the same as those arising from public care. It means
that private care provision must have at least the quality of its public alternative
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(otherwise no one would buy the service). Let this quality difference be represented
by a single parameter θ. It can be translated as waiting time, or more generally it
includes other factors (such as the ability to choose the exact date and location of
treatment). Each individual varies in his valuation of this quality by the parameter
gi. If θ is thought as waiting time, gi can be thought as the rate at which his
health care benefit decreases, as the wait imposes costs on individuals in terms of
lost earnings or further pain (Goddard et al.[1998]). The value of public treatment
for individual i is Vi exp(−giθ). Although public care has no user direct price,
the individual bears the costs of access to public facilities (ci). It follows that the
potential user is indifferent between private and public care when
Vi − Vi exp(−giθ) = pi − ci (4.1)
and the individual is indifferent between private care and no care when
Vi = pi (4.2)
and, finally, the individual is indifferent between public care and no care when
Vi − Vi exp(−giθ) = ci. (4.3)
We see that when pi decreases, the use of private services grows up, accompanied
by a decrease in public care use and no care. When ci diminishes, there will be the
more and more individuals to prefer public care, reducing the use of private and
no care. An increase in gi and θ will shift up the use of private health, reduce the
use of public care and increase no care alternative. When Vi rises, the use of both,
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private and public care increases.
Obviously, all these parameters will vary across individuals. Concerning Vi, dif-
ferent individuals with the same level of clinical need may nevertheless perceive
that they would receive very different benefits from treatment, depending, for ins-
tance, on their social and economic circumstances. This parameter is likely to be
influenced by the advice of doctors and other medical staff. It also reflects the
health status of the individual (severity of illness, degree of his risk aversion). Ta-
king θ as waiting time, gi is expected to be a positive function of income and
employment conditions. When θ is the quality of public care, gi is the valuation of
the quality of public services. This quality can of course vary between providers and
between population groups. Costs of private and other alternatives of care vary,
and may depend on the individual’s income, medical insurance coverage, educatio-
nal and cultural background. In particular, the relative cost of private health care
is greater for the poor than for the rich.
The nature of medical care involves prices to be a function of past use of services.
Literature underlines the importance of transaction costs affecting access to care.
Costs of search affect not only patients but also health care providers. Moreover,
information asymmetry makes that trust becomes a very important issue. As an
individual makes an effort communicating his illness history, he may be less eager
to renew this effort. Thus, he will less likely want to change doctor/health center.
This is valid also for those individuals who have recently used, say, public care ;
having lower public care search costs, they will probably use it again. In sum,
current use of health services highly depends on past experiences.
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4.3.2 The econometric model
In order to model the choice that the individual makes between public, private
and no care we define a set of binary variables to indicate which alternative j is
chosen. Among three alternatives, j = 1 stands for no care, while j = 2 denotes pu-
blic care and j = 3 private care. With independent observations, the log-likelihood
for a multinomial model (MNL) takes the form
logL =
n∑
i=1
mijlogPij. (4.4)
The MNL logit uses,
Pij =
exp(xiβj)∑J
m=1 exp(xiβm)
(4.5)
with a normalization that βj=1 = 0 ∪ βj=2 = 0 ∪ βj=3 = 0. The normalization
reflects the fact that only relative probabilities can be identified, with respect to
the base alternative. The valuation associated with each alternative can be derived
from McFadden’s random utility model. We define individual i′s utility from choice
j as
Uij = ziαj + xijβ + ǫij (4.6)
where z denotes characteristics that vary across individuals but not across the
choices, and x denotes characteristics that vary across the choices. The model
assumes that individuals are aware of the unobservable characteristics ǫij , and the
individual is assumed to choose the alternative that gives the maximum utility, so
choices are based on net utilities (P (mij > mki) for all m 6= j). Typically the ǫij
are assumed to be type I extreme value, which has the convenient property that
the difference between two Extreme Value I variables has a logistic distribution.
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Thus the statistical model that results from the choice of alternative is the MNL
model :
P (mi = j) =
exp(ziαj + xijβ)∑J
k=1 exp(ziαk + xikβ)
(4.7)
where mi is the observed choice of individual i.
The specific characteristics that will influence the choice the individual makes
include income and education status, the costs of accessing each service (which
will be a function of past use) and the perceived quality of health service (personal
opinion on health service). Thus, the net valuation of alternative j will depend on :
m∗i,j = f(Xi, mi,jt−1; ǫij), j = 1, 2, 3 (4.8)
where Xi is a set of personal and socio-economic variables including income, and
subjective impressions on health service provided, mi,jt−1 is the use of alternative
j in the last period, and ǫij is white noise.
The data base permits investigation on health care choice at three time points (s).
It means that the data allows us to evaluate the impact of past use of one service
on another and the past use of one alternative on another. Allowing for “cross-
service” and “cross-alternative” effects, the final form of the utility for alternative
j of service s at time t is :
ms∗ijt = β0Xit + β1mijt−1 + β2mij′t−1 + β3T + ǫijt, j = 1, 2, 3 (4.9)
where mijt and mij′t are vectors of past service use, j
′ is the other alternatives, T
is a vector of time dummies, and ǫijt is white noise error.
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4.3.3 The data
“Social diagnosis : objective and subjective quality of life in Poland” permits
to define the use of three services : (i) first contact doctor, (ii) dental visit and
(iii) inpatient stay. The survey collected the responses given by individuals from a
representative sample. If the respondent used any of these services in year t and
any of his use was private, he is recorded as having positive private use in year t.
If he used any of these services and none of them was private, he is recorded as
having positive public use in year t. If the respondent consulted a family doctor in
year t and any of consultation was privately paid, he is recorded as having positive
doctor use in year t. If none of these consultation was privately paid, he is recorded
as having positive public doctor use in year t. Similarly, if the respondent had den-
tal care and any of that care was private, he is recorded as having private dental
care. If he consulted a dentist, and none of the visit was private, he is recorded as
having public dental care. The last category is inpatient hospital stay. If this stay
is paid out-of-pocket, the respondent is recorded as having a private stay. If the
stay was not privately paid for, he is recorded as a public hospital user.
Although the survey questions were very precise, an astute analysis of the data
reveals however that one has to be extremely careful while interpreting the res-
ponses. The reason is that people think a given service as private only when they
have to additionally pay for. It means that public/private health service provision
is thought as having rather financing than ownership division. Thus, one has to
be considerate while assessing opinions that public medical protection cares less
about patients than the private one does. People take as public only those health
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services which are publicly financed. They exclude therefore health units which are
privately owned and provide health services contracted by National Health Fund.
4.4 Factors influencing the demand for private/public
healthcare
A multinomial logit model (MNL) of the use of public and private care is
estimated. The data base permits to estimate our model for two waves (2003 and
2005). The table 1 presents results for three sets of services in 2003 and two sets of
services in 2005. The results for the use of any care for two periods prove that the
coefficients are well defined and indicate significant differences between users of the
different alternatives. The results for the use of any care show that users of private
care in both waves share some demographic characteristics. Women were less likely
to demand private health in 2003, whereas they were more likely to do so in 2005.
Educational attainment is positively associated with the private sector use, but, as
time goes by, its influence becomes insignificant. Previous analysis of public health
services use have found a positive association between public use and education,
which is sometimes seen as the evidence of middle class capture of the welfare
state. Surprisingly, being unemployed was positively associated with general use
of private health services in 2003, while it turned to be negatively associated with
that use in 2005. In our opinion, this result reflects the general preference of Poles
to additionally pay for immediate health care and thus to overcome barriers in
access to health services (waiting lists), no matter the price. Income, as expected,
influences more the demand for private health services, and that for both waves.
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We find no clear evidence that smokers are less likely to use any medical service,
as it was claimed in literature. In the case of “first contact” family doctor, there
is a strong preference for private services, and it becomes stronger for those who
benefited from employer-paid family health-care packages. The same is true for
dental visits, with a “youth effect” being, however, less pronounced. Private dental
visits were, in general, preferable comparing to public alternative. This is rather an
obvious finding, as long as the variety of free public dental intervention is extremely
limited in Poland (excepting free check-ups for children). This private dental care
preference, conditional on age, did not depend on income. When it turns to analyze
inpatient healthcare provision preferences, conditional on being hospitalized, older
people were more likely to choose public institutions, whereas high-skilled or high-
educated active individuals living in big cities favored private hospital care.
Although the results indicate a strong association between lagged and current
use, they vary not only between two survey ways, but between sets of services
as well. In 2003, overall private use was positively associated with either public
or private use in past period, whereas in 2005, surprisingly, past private use is
negatively associated with current public use. Further, for 2003 and 2005 survey,
the estimated effect of past use of services in the same sector (“the same-sector”
effect) is substantially larger than the estimated effect of past use of services in the
other sector. For example, taking the 2005 survey, the marginal effect of of lagged
use of exclusively public services on current use of public sector is 0.061 while the
effect of lagged use of private sector services on current use of the public care is
−0.049. The “same-/cross-sector” effects for lagged private care are −0.058 and
0.086 respectively (table 2).
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Tab. 4.1 – Multinomial logit estimates of healthcare provider choice
Any service use Doctor visit Inpatient stay Dental visit
private care public care private care public care private care public care private care
2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005
Income 0.000** 0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.013** -0.004 -0.018** -0.005** -0.021** -0.006* -0.021** -0.005* 0.001 -0.009* -0.030 -0.009** -0.028**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) ((0.004) (0.002) (0.033) (0.004) (0.028) (0.003) (0.004)
Gender -0.823** 0.095 -0.569** 0.160* -0.984** 0.014 -0.567** 0.105 -0.176 0.060 -1.034 0.191 -1.048**
(man=1) (0.081) (0.084) (0.064) (0.065) (0.148) (0.086) (0.140) (0.002) (1.025) (0.141) (0.886) (0.107) (0.142)
Education 0.133** 0.001 0.007 -0.000 0.101** 0.013* -0.036 0.003 -0.003 0.030* -0.093 0.020 0.170**
(0.014) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.025) (0.006) (0.024) (0.005) (0.190) (0.014) (0.165) (0.013) (0.024)
Jobless 0.304* -0.097 0.011 0.111 0.350 -0.059 0.185 0.114 -0.230 -0.093 0.238 0.236 0.033
(0.130) (0.142) (0.094) (0.102) (0.260) (0.150) (0.229) (0.109) (1.501) (0.247) (1.369) (0.172) (0.230)
Smoker 0.032 -0.181* 0.053 -0.020 0.226 -0.059 0.395* -0.020 -0.208 -0.101 -0.077 0.223 0.162
(0.089) (0.092) (0.070) (0.070) (0.174) (0.098) (0.162) (0.074) (1.047) (0.162) (0.897) (0.118) (0.164)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HC appreciation,
barriers in access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Effectiveness
of reforms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
public use t-1 0.854** 0.113 0.860** 0.285** 0.124 -0.089 0.171 0.231 0.135 -0.004 1.353 0.423 -0.086
(0.101) (0.093) (0.077) (0.072) (0.197) (0.202) (0.185) (0.190) (1.198) (0.668) (1.153) (0.615) (0.288)
private use t-1 1.347** 0.537** 0.261** -0.010 0.619* 0.758** 0.062 0.130 dropped 0.666 dropped -0.292 0.701
(0.103) (0.090) (0.095) (0.075) (0.265) (0.095) (0.226) (0.082) - (0.342) - (0.332) (0.666)
Sample size 5725 5066 2725 5066 1328 4667 1328 4667 1038 1914 1038 1914 1468
*significant at 10% level
**significant at 5% level
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Tab. 4.2 – Multinomial logit estimates of marginal effects of public and private
use (2005 wave)
Any service use
private care public care
dy/dx dy/dx
Income 0.000** -7.40e-06
(0.000) (0.001)
Age -0.002 -0.009*
(0.003) (0.004)
Gender 0.001 0.031*
(0.011) (0.014)
Education 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
Jobless -0.022 0.035
(0.017) (0.023)
Smoker -0.024* 0.009
(0.011) (0.015)
Healthcare appreciation, barriers in access Yes Yes
Effectiveness of reforms Yes Yes
public use t-1 -0.058 0.061**
(0.012) (0.016)
private use t-1 0.086** 0.049**
(0.013) (0.016)
*significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
The MNL model assumes that its outcomes are independent of all other alter-
natives. This is IIA property (Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives). Many
scholars are finding more and more of a problem with the MNL model because it
is so rare that we can be reasonably sure that the IIA actually holds. But in our
situation, we strongly believe that the ratio of the probability of choosing private
or public health services was affected by no care users’ entry into the system -
which seems unlikely, given the estimations we ran above. Nevertheless, we have
decided to test this MNL model assumption. Most IIA tests involve the comparison
of a model estimated using a full set of choice alternatives with a model estimated
using a restricted set of choice alternatives. The logic behind the Hausman and
McFadden [1984] test is that if the IIA property is valid, the parameters of the
restricted set model should be “approximately the same” as those of the full choice
120
set model. A practical implementation issue associated with this test is that it
requires the analyst to take the inverse of the difference between two closely rela-
ted covariance matrices, which may be nearly singular. In many cases it does not
work. We have therefore chosen to use Small and Hsiao’s [1985] exact test for the
IIA assumption. The basic idea of this test is that if the IIA assumption holds,
the log-likelihood for the restricted choice set will not be too different from the
log-likelihood computed over the restricted choice set using parameters obtained
from the full choice set. The resulting test statistic is asymptotically chi-square
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters. Table 3
presents the results.
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Tab. 4.3 – Small-Hsiao test of IIA assumption
2003 wave, Any servic use 2005 wave, Any service use
Omitted alternative lnL (full) lnL (restricted) chi2 df p>chi2 Evidence lnL (full) lnL (restricted) chi2 df p>chi2 Evidence
private use -1434.729 -1432.533 4.392 9 0.884 for H0 -1437.189 -1432.378 9.621 9 0.382 for H0
public use -914.953 -911.169 7.567 9 0.578 for H0 -892.084 -887.313 9.541 9 0.389 for H0
H0 : Odds (outcome j
versus outcome k)
are independent of other
alternatives
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We detect no significant departure from IIA. It appears, thus, that the IIA
assumption does hold for our model specification. Finally, the fact that our mo-
del assumes IIA for any single choice does not mean that would not affect the
predictions of probabilities health care choice in the future.
4.5 Further discussion on health care preferences
We think that the most important result of our study is the general will of
population to have access to immediate and good quality health. Indeed, income
factor has very little influence on decision to use private health services in case of
emergency or very specialistic intervention. In general, in emergency cases, people
rather prefer being indebted or ask family for financial help than wait for medical
help. Furthermore, one has to remember that even if public health services are
theoretically free, healing with public sector becomes sometimes costly. For ins-
tance, if the inpatient stay requires a close watch over, the inmate has to pay all
additional nurse duty. It is also more and more frequent that patients are invited
to pay for some surgical materials, like fibres . Surgical fibres are of course provi-
ded by hospital, but their quality is often doubtful. There also exist some other
inpatient voluntary payments like upgraded hospital canteen fee, for instance. On
the other hand the “Social Diagnosis” reveals that informal payments and all other
monetary or physical “acknowledgements” become less frequent (23% decrease in
2005 compared to 2003).
If private spending for health services is frequent, the demand for complementary
health assurances should follow. Surprisingly, it is not the case. In 2005 as far
as 42% of respondents were not interested in such care plans and another 44%
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admitted they could not afford for due to financial problems. Among those who
were interested in additionally paid medical plans, the majority claims the will
to pay for this not more than 100 zloty. This derisory sum, however, cannot be
sufficient to cover medical needs of each member of the family, and that even if
each and every household pays its contribution. Furthermore, it was difficult to
get information on private health care plans already bought. The reason for this
is that people think “private medical assurance” even if it is their employer who
pays for. Employer-paid medical assurances are popular in big cities and among
executive and managerial staff and take part of standard complementary employ-
ment advantage packages. When it comes to analyze the additional payments in
public sector, the fee for comfort-upgraded room seems to be the one and only
legitimated, reasonable and publicly acceptable.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper constitutes the very first attempt to assess the health care sec-
tor in the case of transition country. Our goal was to unravel the reasons why
people are more likely to chose private or public sector while looking for health
care. Contrary to previous studies on the demand for health care, we find that the
health care provider choice is not strongly related to income. Of course, people
constantly using private sector are richer, but we observe also a strong willingness
to pay additionally for immediate and good quality health among people having
rather moderate revenues. Private use is highly determined by educational status
and other demographic characteristics (place of living). There is also an evidence
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of association between past and present use of private health care. However, the
relation is not as straightforward as before in the case of past and current use of
public health care. Past private use is, in turn, negatively associated with current
public use (“cross-sector effect”).
Our results indicate that people are not very keen about buying a complimentary
medical assurance, and this even in public sector where the out-of-pocket payments
are common obligation. A possible explication may be, on the one hand, the lack
of information from insurance companies, and, on the other hand, no governmental
policy incentives. The last reason is, in our opinion, the most important one. When
financial sources for public health care are scarce, the government should try to
change the common perception of public sector where everything is “for free”. In
Poland the statement about totally free public health care does not hold anymore.
Therefore, the co-payment system based on private assurances may become a long-
term solution. Another possibility is the employer-beared complimentary medical
assurance package, that should become more popular. But this only would be suc-
cessful if employer’s charges, in general, diminish (tax relief, etc.)
Finally, in order to stop the huge outflow of physicians and other medical pro-
fessionals, instead of increasing their salaries (which is not immediately feasible),
the solution seems to be the obligation for freshly graduated doctors to exercise
in Poland. This solution, undoubtely questioned, is justified by the high cost of
formation and training of newcomers in medical professions.
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A Final Plea
“I am convinced that what took place in Central Eastern Europe during the past de-
cade and a half, is an unparalleled success story in history. I believe this, in spite of
the fact that I am fully aware of the grief and disappointment it was associated with.”
Ja´nos Kornai [2005]
Presidential Address, International Economic Association, 14th World Congress, Marrakech, Morocco.
Presentation on August 29, 2005, p.20
I
n this dissertation, we have managed a discussion on the state’s roles and in-
volvement in transition countries. Once again, we wish to look back at the
conclusions of our empirical studies.
The efficiency analysis of electricity distribution companies in Poland (chapter
2) permitted us to put some light on the regulatory challenges in transition coun-
tries. Thus, investigating the regulatory design, we question its accuracy, taking
into account the informational gap between the regulatory agency and electricity
distribution companies. Therefore, we have shown that efficiency studies might be
helpful to improve the quality of regulation. At the same time, however, we claim
that the benchmarking methods should rather be taken as technical tools than de-
finitive indicators. The question of electricity distribution gave us also a chance to
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broaden the discussion on public service obligations, as the related issues became
more and more complex in the context of imminent energy sector liberalization.
The third chapter of this dissertation made possible to assess the state’s in-
volvement in the infrastructure provision schemes in a transitional environment.
Following actions of the Polish state in the case of a PPP-type A2 highway conces-
sion agreement, we have shown that inappropriate contract design and the blatant
errors during its execution could only yield as a pitfall. While analyzing this specific
concession agreement, we have also revealed some deficiencies in authority dele-
gation fulfilment and control-related issues in the case of a special purpose public
agency. Therefore, we stress an extreme importance of any bureaucratic procedure,
that should be simple and clear so as to bring the general ease of administration.
The last chapter has provided a reader with an empirical analysis of welfare
state in transition. Our estimation of demand for private health care in Poland sur-
prisingly reflects a growing interest in additionally paid health care services. While
public health sector suffers from underfinancing and the outflow of staff, people
seem to highly value private medical services that are of good quality and of im-
mediate access. However, the government should put more effort in establishing of
necessary conditions, that aim at building of an effective market of complementary
medical assurance.
Briefly, in this dissertation, we have chosen an example of Poland to empiri-
cally investigate some issues that might illustrate our initial hypothesis claiming
a gradual retreat of the state from its very basic, and in a way, constitutional
functions. Within our case studies, we have proven that the state is playing a vital
role in successful development efforts, but we have also recognized that the wrong
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kind of state intervention can be highly detrimental. We have recognized that the
scope and effectiveness of government activities, rather than simply the size of the
government’s budget or personnel, is the key issue.
In this concluding section we wish to focus on the more fundamental question,
which underlines the discussion on challenges that are still relevant as we finish
the second decade of transition. From our point of view, the possibly most difficult
task for today is the accomplishment of the reform of the state to alleviate the
chronic state failure of communism. An important first choice has been the nature
of constitution - parliamentary or presidential rule. The next task was to rebuilt
the state apparatus, which has turned out to be particularly cumbersome. What
should be done now is the civil service reform and its serviceableness. In order to
do so, a substantial renewal of cadres is necessary. This, in turn, may be helpful in
a difficult fight against corruption. While only hardline communist claim that mar-
ket reform has caused corruption, a common belief is that transition has boosted
corruption. And a frequent liberal instinct is that the larger the government, the
greater corruption. However, this statement is not really true, because the quality
of the government is missing in this reasoning. That is why in this dissertation
we have insisted on the quality, feasibility, simplicity, soundness, smoothness and
coordination of governmental actions. It follows that given the weight of the public
sector in a modern economy, its role in setting and implementing the rules of the
game, its importance in providing law and order, it is easy to see that, for econo-
mic efficiency and dynamism, a well-functioning public sector is key. As we could
see, in some transition economies, unfortunately, the quality of the public sector
is deeply disappointing.
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A careful reader has surely noticed that we dwelled extensively on the wel-
fare state reforms. Focusing on health care services design we were highlighting
difficulties in changing people’s mentality, which - simplifying a little - means to
tell the people that not everything is “for free”. This is only one exemple of some
researcher’s view about post-socialist societies where people expect the state to
continue its paternalistic behavior : expect the state to totally control pensions,
family’s provisions, jobs, health, and so on, as its communist forebear used to do.
That is why we think that securing the understanding and support of society is
vitally important if any welfare reform is to succeed. We have shown that Poles
are interested in additional paying for medical services, but, surprisingly, they do
not want medical assurances. The reason is that they know very little about such
coverage for medical risks. And this is because the government failed to do its
informational job.
Generally speaking, there is still scarce relevant information about people’s
expectations on the state’s role in welfare reforms (the most interesting one is“The
Social Consequences of Transition”, conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and the former East Germany under the auspices of the Institute
of Human Sciences in Vienna in 1995 and has, unfortunately not been updated
since). In our opinion, such a pluridisciplinar study should take place, providing
governments and international institutions with precious aid in formulating social
policy goals. Of course, one can say that the result of election is the best reflection
of nation’s preferences, but it cannot be taken for granted in case of countries
where participation rate rarely outruns 50%.
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This lack of trust in democratic mechanisms, a gradually melting reliance on go-
vernmental actions is maybe the most striking paradox of late transition. People’s
deep belief that “no matter who in power, it will not be better” is very dangerous
for the overall stability of transition process. It seems that Poles, Czechs or Hunga-
rians just care less about their influence on public affairs. In majority, they are still
perceiving the state as an extremely complicated machinery that remains austere
for citizens. In addition, constant scandals “on the heights of power” do not favor
the change of this unfortunate situation. To give an exemple, after the decentrali-
zation reform in Poland, people figured out that the new territorial design is rather
incomprehensive, making some basic administrative procedures (passport request,
car registration, etc.) more complicated. In that sense, the reform supposed to
bring the state closer to citizens, has done the contrary, taking chance to make the
red tape flourish. As a result, after all those years of changes, it did not change a
lot in front of the public counter. And people are convinced that it is not going to
change soon either.
Of course, we do notice some successful welfare reforms. Regarding pension re-
forms for instance, in most of the OECD- member and transition countries, much
has been done to put the future finances of the pension system on a sustainable
footing, especially limiting pathways to early retirement for favoured groups of
workers. Spending on pensions is supposed to fall gradually, and the gross replace-
ment rate from the public scheme should be about 60% of a given pensioner income
while working. Complementary part would come from private individual accounts,
based on primes from capital markets. However, there is still a risk that benefits
will be lower for low earners after the reform. OECD’s forecasts show that for
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someone with half average earnings, for example, the net replacement rate (after
taxes and contributions) will fall to 75%. Thus, there is a risk that the rebalancing
of benefits away from low and middle earners towards high earners may come up
with an increase in old-age poverty in the future or increased pressure on the social
assistance system, thereby compromising the long-term fiscal gains.
And precisely, how to reconcile high rate of growth with both economic and so-
cial equilibrium is the main dilemma of late transition. In other words, the biggest
challenge is how to reconcile fiscal discipline with the need to finance modernisa-
tion efforts and, in the same time, how to maintain some degree of social cohesion.
First, fiscal restraint is one of very few short-run instruments in the hands of
the authorities to reduce the gap between savings and investments. As long as
there is no institutions developed enough to stimulate private saving, which is a
time-consuming process linked to welfare reforms, and as long as the wave of in-
vestments does not produce more exports, there will be a strong pressure to reduce
budget deficit or, indeed, to have a surplus. At the same time, public funds have
to be provided to co-finance industrial restructuring, modernizing infrastructure
and improving natural environment. Also, it is necessary that the structural funds
from the EU match domestic component. Fundamental reforms of the expendi-
ture side of the budget coupled with drastic cuts where inessential, are the only
way how these two exigences can be reconciled. Recent experiences show, however,
that when you undertake a deep reform, as it happened with health sector or local
government, prospective gains in efficiency are preceded by increased costs. You
have to invest first, and only later you can reap the benefits.
133
Second, fast growth does not automatically solve acute social problems. Exces-
sive income disparities, regional differences and poverty have to be tackled, or the
situation may get out of hand. Fiscal austerity makes it all but impossible to try to
build a generous welfare-state-type social policy. On the other hand, there will al-
ways be a pressure to better streamline expenditures, eliminate waste and restrict
the spending programs to the very basic level. Such prudence may be salutary,
as poverty and social exclusion has never been properly addressed, nor solved, by
careless spending behavior. However, intelligent methods of fighting poverty might
be used. These are, in our opinion, massive investment in education, particularly
in rural areas and support for small and medium enterprises (SME). Poverty is
linked to unemployment, and jobs are created almost exclusively in the SME sec-
tor. Lack of education makes people unemployable, even if demand for labor is
rising. Thus, the recipe seems obvious. It requires certain budgetary support and
knowledge how to spend public money in a most efficient way.
Summing up, transition has so far brought great achievements. Unprecedented
success for some, justified hopes for many others, but also disappointment for the
least fortunate.
Far from being exhaustive, we wish that this dissertation would provide readers
with better understanding of late transition period. Even if our thoughts are based
on one transition country, we strongly believe that our conclusions are relevant in
case of others. And because we are convinced that there is still much to explore,
we would like to extend this study, at least in a threefold way.
Clearly, concerning welfare reforms, one would like to investigate the dyna-
mics of labor markets and migration issue after the last two EU enlargements.
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Some clarifications about migration, employment, remittances need to be done, at
least in order to fight against misleading facts and opinions. In our future research
work, we would like to put some light on the coercive attributs of the state, that
are judiciary and penology. Once again, we believe that economic analysis might
be helpful in reforming institutions, making judges, prosecutors, attorneys and
guard’s work more efficient and valuable. This, in turn, would positively influence
public spending. Finally, economic literature tells little about restructuring of sun-
set industries. This issue, however, cannot be forgotten, being a very important
nexus of social cohesion.
135
Comment concilier service public et concurrence ?
Essais sur le roˆle de l’Etat durant la transition
Re´sume´
Cette the`se e´tudie la question de la place qu’occupe l’Etat dans les pays de l’ancien bloc so-
cialiste, et ce a` l’aube de la troisie`me de´cennie des re´formes. En retenant l’exemple polonais
pour appre´cier concre`tement ce que l’on peut de´ja` pressentir comme des nouvelles responsabili-
te´s de l’Etat, nous avons choisi d’analyser l’efficacite´ de l’action publique sous trois perspectives,
chacune d’entre elles correspondant a` un chapitre. Dans quelle mesure l’Etat entraˆıne-t-il une
rede´finition de la regulation d’activite´s e´conomique ? Quel roˆle joue-t-il dans la fourniture des
biens publics ? Comment s’y prend-t-il pour achever les re´formes sociales ? La nouvelle configura-
tion e´conomique et sociale amplifie certains dysfonctionnements inhe´rents au syste`me transitoire
tout en introduisant de nouvelles distorsions, comme l’illustre pertinemment le secteur public
en Pologne. Cette the`se analyse certains aspects des interactions entre deux sphe`res,publique et
prive´e, a` la lumie`re des changements profonds qui accompagnent la nouvelle donne.
Discipline : Sciences e´conomiques
Mots-cle´s : Economie de la transition, Economie publique
How to reconcile public servic and competition ?
Essays on the state’s behavior during a systemic transition
Abstract
This thesis investigates a question of a place for the state in the post-socialist countries during the
period of late transition. Taking a Polish example, we analyze the effectiveness of public actions
from three angles, each one being a chapter. To what extend the state redefines the regulation of
economic activities ? What part does the state play in the public goods provision? How does the
state draw to a close hard social reforms ? A new economic and social context underlines some
issues inherent to the transition system, while creating new distortions, as shown by the public
sector in Poland. This thesis aims at analyzing some aspects of interactions between public and
private spaces, in the light of changes that go along with the new order.
Discipline : Economics
Keywords : Transition economics, public economics
Intitule´ et adresse du laboratoire : Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (CES), Universite´
Paris I et CNRS UMR 8174, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital,
75647 Paris Cedex 13, France
